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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
Austerity Gets Local: 
An Exploration of Connections Between 
Public Sector Debt and Wages 
 
by 
 
Justin Gustave McBride 
 
Master in Urban & Regional Planning 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Christopher C. Tilly, Chair 
 
The regression models of this study show a negative correlation between municipal debt burden and public 
sector expenditures on salaries for cities in Southern California in the period before, during, and after the 
Great Recession. The association appears across various ways of measuring debt burden. Other models also 
show a negative relationship between starting wages for low-wage workers and increased debt burden, 
though this relationship disappears for higher-wage job classifications. Interviews with union negotiators 
indicate that unions do not generally pay attention to the effects of debt service on collective bargaining 
outcomes, and may be missing this negative relationship. I close with a recommendation that unions take a 
closer look at how cities finance their operations, and their relationships with bondholders. In particular, 
public sector unions may wish to rethink their position on some debt-financed development since they may 
be see a long-term loss in compensation across their membership. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This study examines the correlation between municipal debt burden and compensation for public 
sector workers in Southern California. In the years leading up to the Great Recession, California cities 
began to borrow money at an increased pace. The Recession sped up this trend (Edwards, 2016). At the 
same time, cities made drastic cuts to total salary expenditures to respond to the financial crisis (Warner, 
2012). No existing scholarship explores the connection between the two phenomena.  
 Using regression analysis, I show that there is a connection between increased debt burden and 
lower city expenditures on wages. Additional regression models further show that city debt burdens may 
correlate to lower starting wages for low-wage public sector workers. Debt service is thus partially a 
redistribution of tax revenues from low wage city employees to bondholders – typically wealthy investors.  
 Furthermore, my qualitative research reveals that, except in a few rare cases, public sector unions do 
not pay much attention to the role of city debt and the ramifications of city fiscal policy on collective 
bargaining. Unions are concerned with maintaining high levels of union membership in the face of a right-
wing attack and for the most part are not examining the effects of the shift in urban fiscal policy toward 
higher debt burdens. My regression analysis supports that union negotiators may be missing a significant 
component to lower wage offerings they have felt at the bargaining table in recent years.  
 In this section, I briefly outline the historic background and present context for the two main foci 
of my study – municipal debt and public sector employment. I close the chapter with a roadmap for the 
remainder of the thesis. 
  
 
2 
 
Debt 
 The municipal bond market has long served as the most common way for cities in the United 
States to raise money, particularly for capital projects. Most cities borrow money on the bond market at 
least occasionally. A commonly used training textbook for municipal budget officers encourages debt 
financing for capital projects as a way to ensure ‘intergenerational equity’ – basically so future residents also 
pay for a share of the public good (Bland, 2013). The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA), 
the primary association for state and local government finance officials in the United States and Canada, 
considers the activity so common that they have myriad resources training officers how to borrow. Most 
texts urge city officials to maintain a ‘debt policy’ – a rigid but city specific set of rules outlining when that 
city should or should not borrow more money – but offer few specifics about what limits they might want 
to include (Tigue, 1998 or Scott, 2010 for two examples). The California State Treasurer maintains a 
permanent special commission to help lower levels of government in the state access the bond market, the 
California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC). The Commission periodically updates 
an over 600-page report to instruct municipal officers how to borrow money (CDIAC, 2006).  
 In short, for public officials, municipal bonds are not controversial in any way. According to the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) free on-line data, 
in calendar year 2018, US municipalities borrowed $376 billion dollars over 10,500 distinct bond 
offerings, an average of $428 million per issue (EMMA, nd). It was a slow year -- figure 1.1 shows trends 
over the past few years. The Congressional Research Service estimates cities owed over $3 trillion in 
outstanding debt in 2017 (Driessen, 2018).  
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Figure 1.1 
 
  
 It is easy to forget how we got here. Though municipal bonds have been used since at least the 
Italian Renaissance (Arrighi, 1994), the modern US municipal bond market actually came about during the 
entrepreneurial city era, when cities were basically start-ups. Inspired by the financing used to build the Erie 
Canal (Sbragia, 1996), city founders in the post-Civil War and turn of the century realized the quickest 
way to build a city was to borrow someone else’s money for the infrastructure costs. If things worked out, 
great, there would be a new tax base to pay it off. If not, well, ultimately it was someone else’s money; 
caveat creditor.  
 City founders of the era also used debt as a tool for economic development, sometimes borrowing 
with one hand and handing the money off to railroad companies or industrial firms with the other. This 
direct subsidy promoted economic development and allowed cities to compete with other new urban start-
ups. Cities frequently defaulted on loans, often a very popular move with residents who did not want to 
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shoulder the burden of multi-year debt service payments. In some cases, defaults occurred as a result of 
citizen ballot initiatives. In one legendary example, a city council avoided creditors by dodging process 
service for over two decades during a default (Monkkonen, 1984).1 Nationwide, the situation was so 
chaotic that both federal and state governments eventually intervened, restricting how much debt cities 
could issue and on what terms (Sbragia, 1996).  
 Local governments innovated ways to evade these restrictions by creating quasi-governmental 
authorities. Perennial planning villain Robert Moses opened the contemporary era of municipal bonds with 
one such innovation. He discovered that, through periodic refinancing of bonded debt, he could 
indefinitely extend the lifespan of his specific-purpose authorities which expired when they no longer owed 
money (Sbragia, 1996).   
 Although municipal debt instruments have become increasingly complicated since the 1980s, all 
municipal debt has common core aspects. Cities borrow money for whatever purpose, and then have to pay 
the money back, with interest, through a series of payments over a fixed timeline. Interest and principal 
payments together are called ‘debt service.’ The municipality is called the borrower or debtor, and the 
entity which loans the city money is called the lender or the bondholder. The instruments of debt have 
many different names and structures, but most are colloquially called bonds. Borrowing can be short term – 
a way to meet payroll before the state government remits sales taxes, for example – or long term – 30 years 
or more for some long-lasting public good capital projects. The rule of thumb is that the lifespan of the 
bond should not be longer than the lifespan of the public project (Bland, 2013).   
 There are two main types of municipal bonds. General obligation (GO) bonds are issued solely on 
the ‘full faith and credit’ of the borrower, which just means the city will pay the money back from its 
multiple revenue streams (CDIAC, 2006). The use of GO bonds rose steeply in California after Howard 
                                                          
1 It worked. The lenders eventually gave up. 
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Jarvis’s tax revolt in the 1970s. Arguably Jarvis’s most lasting success, Proposition 13 limited local property 
tax revenues. Proposition 46, another Jarvis-era constitutional amendment, mandates a 2/3 majority of 
voters to approve any GO issuances (Working Partnerships USA, 2006). Because of this requirement, GO 
bonds are relatively rare at the local level in California.  
 The other main type of bond is a revenue bond. Revenue bonds are secured by a specific revenue 
stream, either one that currently exists or one which will be created through the capital expenditure funded 
by the bond itself. Because revenue bonds in theory are not backed by the full credit of a municipality, they 
almost always have higher interest rates (Bland, 2013).  
 Despite the obvious downside of a higher interest rate, revenue bonds are far more common at the 
local level for a very specific reason – when issued by an authority, they are exempt from oversight of the 
electorate (Sbragia, 1983). In California, for example, financing authorities or other types of spin-off 
governments avoid the 2/3 voter approval requirement from Proposition 46. California courts upheld this 
dynamic in Andrews v. City of San Bernardino (1959) and Gibbs v. City of Napa (1976), when they ruled 
that actions of authorities are not even subject to referenda from residents. 
 Authority revenue bonds are very common. Authorities almost never issue GO bonds because they 
have no full faith or credit; since they are essentially single-purpose on-paper entities, they have no 
dedicated revenues besides whatever a city grants them (CDIAC, 2006). The lease revenue bond is a 
common authority financing tool. A city sets up a special authority and grants the authority a piece of 
valuable city property, like city hall, for a nominal amount. The authority then leases the property back to 
the city and uses the future lease payments as collateral for a bond. The authority can spend the money on 
any project, and there is no requirement to secure voter approval.  
 Although authorities are nominally independent from the city, in practice no city would allow any 
subordinate agency or authority to default on a revenue bond. Bondholders rely on assessments by credit 
ratings agencies to assess city fiscal health. If a city’s authority did default, ratings agencies would savage the 
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parent city’s credit rating, which could create all kinds of fiscal complications – higher interest rates in the 
future, creditors attempting to call in debts, or an inability to refinance loans as a few examples. Although 
the authority is technically a distinct political entity, from a lender’s perspective they are one and the same. 
Municipal bond default rates are thus exceptionally low compared to other types of bonds, regardless of 
the issuer (Foster, 2017; Moody’s, 2017).  
 There is a robust secondary market in bonds, as lenders sell them to 3rd parties on the financial 
market. Investors seek out municipal bonds because interest income is steady, low-risk, and generally tax-
free. The latter aspect differentiates municipal bonds from private enterprise bonds or stocks (Foster, 
2017). Because income is tax free, municipal debt is especially attractive to high-tax bracket investors, a 
trend which is increasing; the wealthiest 0.5% of US households own 42% household owned US 
municipal debt (Bergstresser & Cohen, 2016).  
 From the borrower’s perspective, tax-free status acts as a federal indirect subsidy to the bond. Since 
the federal government does not collect any income tax on the earnings, they shoulder some of the tax 
incidence of the issue without directly paying anything (CDIAC, 2006). This subsidy is not exactly 
intentional, and has been controversial at various conjunctures. Although the exemption periodically comes 
up during negotiations about federal tax reform, changes to regulation has never crystallized (Sbragia, 
1996).  
  California municipalities are especially restricted in their finances, largely due to the legacy of the 
Howard Jarvis tax revolt of the 1970s. As in most places in the country, California cities rely on property 
tax revenues. Due to Proposition 13, however, property tax rates have only been allowed to rise by 2% per 
year since 1978, and are fixed at 1% of the value of property. When courts upheld legislative action to 
dissolve the redevelopment agency system in 2012, they took away a key loophole which cities had often 
used to artificially inflate their share of property tax revenues (Blount et al., 2014).  
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 California cities now rely on a mix of property tax and sales tax revenue, combined with healthy 
doses of state intergovernmental transfers. These streams carry baggage. Transfers are dependent on 
political whimsy – and the political influence of the recipient – in Sacramento. Sales tax revenues are 
notably volatile during recessions (Edwards, 2016). Because of issues with all three revenue streams, 
borrowing has taken on increased importance for many California cities. 
 Nothing in this thesis should imply that borrowing on its own is a bad thing for cities to do. A 
healthy use of debt financing is widely recognized as a responsible way to fund capital projects that increase 
a city’s general prosperity.  In particular, the practice is ideal for projects might be too expensive for pay-as-
you-go financing. Debt can fund projects like affordable housing (California’s redevelopment agency 
system was initially designed to build housing, in fact; Black, 2014). Debt can improve everyone’s lives, 
including city employees.  
 It is not clear how much debt is actually used for this purpose, however. As I will discuss in 
Chapter 2, many types of debt issuance are far from transparent, and there is good evidence that in at least 
some cases financial firms have taken advantage of relative naiveté of borrowing public entities. Smaller 
cities in particular enter an unequal playing field with financial institutions since they borrow infrequently 
or may be rated as riskier borrowers. Bigger cities use debt to keep the lights on between tax remittances, 
paying out interest on short-term loans that arguably could be avoided. And because of the relative lack of 
accountability, particularly under authority issued revenue bonds, citizens have little input into how much a 
city can borrow or what it can be spent on.  
 
Public Workers & Their Unions 
 California enjoys the one of the most heavily organized public sectors in the United States, even 
though the state did not even recognize public sector unions for collective bargaining until 1968 (Murolo, 
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2018). Despite this late start, as of 2017 approximately 1.3 million civil servants are covered by a union 
agreement in California – 52.8% of all public sector employees in 2018 (Hirsch & Macpherson, 2018).2  
 The public sector is a large employer. In California, roughly 15% of employed people work in the 
public sector including all levels of government (Hirsch & Macpherson, 2018). There are hundreds of 
unique public employee job classifications. Union workers in the public sector handle a wide variety of 
tasks, including: professional jobs like urban planners or civil engineers; support roles, such as 
administrative assistants or clerks; teachers and education employees; and blue-collar jobs like custodians, 
maintenance workers, vehicle drivers, and mechanics.  
 A large majority of public sector employees work for local governments, including cities, counties, 
and districts – about 65% of all public sector workers and 11% of all workers (Mayer, 2014). According 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in Los Angeles County 10% of all employees work at the local level of 
government (including cities, counties, and districts).3 
 Unionized public sector workers bargain with city officials concerning wages and working 
conditions, and negotiate a legally binding contract called a “collective bargaining agreement” (CBA). 
Studies find that public sector employees actually generally make less than their private-sector counterparts, 
particularly when controlling for total benefit package, except at the lowest education levels (Keefe & Fine, 
2010; Lewin et al., 2012). One North Carolina-based study shows that per capita spending by government 
does go up when workers form a union and negotiate their wages, but the difference is not large. The extra 
expense is offset by reductions in turnover. and may be a symptom of larger numbers of civil servants 
working per resident rather than higher individual wages (Twiddy & Leiter, 2007).  
                                                          
2 As of 2018, California is 12th in public sector union representation by percentage of public sector workers as of 2018. The 
highest percentage is New York State, with 69.7% of public sector workers covered by union representation.  
3 Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 2017-year end values. 
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 Public sector employment is particularly important for some communities. In major United States 
cities, African-Americans are far more likely to work in civil service jobs than their white counterparts 
(Cooper et al., 2012). Over one in five Black workers work in the public sector, and for Black women this 
number approaches one in four (Pitts, 2011). Racism and gender discrimination do not depress wages for 
Black workers in public sector employment to the same degree as in other sectors, and these gaps are 
further tightened when workers bargain through a union (Pitts, 2011; Patrick, 2018). A recent study by 
labor and community organizations of Black public sector workers in Los Angeles County found these 
Black workers enjoyed substantially higher wages, better benefits, and longer tenure on the job than their 
private sector counterparts (Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, 2019).   
 
The Thesis 
 This study is divided into multiple chapters. Chapter 2 covers relevant academic literature 
concerning city debt, looking at relevant texts from traditions of urban public finance, austerity studies, and 
labor relations. Chapter 3 presents the methodology of my own study. I define the multiple variables I use 
in my regression analysis and the methodology I use to assemble my data. I also describe the qualitative 
interviews I use to supplement my primary quantitative analysis. 
 Chapter 4 discusses the regression analyses I use to show a correlation between municipal debt 
burden, on the one hand, and salary expenditures and wage rates on the other hand. Using multiple models, 
I show that there is a relationship between debt burden and lower salary expenditures, and there may be a 
relationship between the stagnancy of worker starting wages for low-wage workers and increased debt 
burdens. Chapter 5 explores these results and discusses ramifications of the correlation. Chapter 6 closes 
with some recommendations for stakeholders.    
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 This research project aims to supplement studies about urban public finance and studies by 
urbanists interested in issues of austerity. By linking the concerns of city finance and union bargaining, I 
also bridge a gap between these areas and labor studies, a discipline concerned with unions and worker 
organizations.  
 As I mention in Chapter 1, debt financing is not a controversial process as long as it is performed 
under somewhat nebulously defined circumstances. Best practices include: having clear debt policies in 
place which limit borrowing (Tigue, 1998, for one); only using borrowed money to pay for capital projects 
and never using it to pay for on-going expenses; not borrowing for longer than the life of the project 
(Bland, 2013, for one); and always repaying on time to avoid unfavorable reassessment by credit agencies 
(Ammar et al., 2001).  
 Above and beyond a push for a debt limit policy, there is a general admonition against borrowing 
too much, though the view of what ‘too much’ is varies greatly. Most state governments, including 
California, have taken measures to limit municipal borrowing at various times. But these same states also 
have allowed cities to get around those limits through special authorities, since technically the authority 
itself borrows the money, not the city (Sbragia, 1996). Although there are a variety of debt burden markers 
which measure a city’s effective debt limit, there is no consensus on how to measure debt burden, making a 
clear limit hard to define (Miranda & Picur, 2008).  
 Though no one may be able to articulate what the debt limit is, the horror stories of cities that go 
over it are very well known and weigh heavily over city staff and officers. Stories like New York’s near 
default in 1975 (Phillips-Fein, 2017), Cleveland’s bankruptcy in 1978 (Asher, 1980), Orange County, 
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California’s bankruptcy in 1994 (Jorion, 1995), and the recent bankruptcies in Detroit and Jefferson 
County, Alabama (Bomey, 2017; Taibbi, 2011) all haunt the narrative around how not to borrow, 
cautionary tales about the financial officers or politicians gone wild. The story goes: ‘borrow responsibly, 
and don’t end up like these guys.’  
 When default does occur, it can be a disaster for cities, and particularly for city employees. Default 
usually leads a city to declare bankruptcy, but unlike businesses, bankruptcy in a city always means 
reorganization of liabilities by a federal administrator. Generally collective bargaining agreements and 
benefits like pension plans all land on the chopping block. Workers in Detroit, for example, saw 
compensation and benefits drop substantially during that city’s 2012 bankruptcy proceedings, with retirees 
bearing a particularly large burden (Bomey, 2017).  
 In fact, though disastrous when it happens, municipal bond default is very rare. According to 
ratings agency Moody’s, between 1970 and 2016, the municipal bond default rate was a mere 0.07% of all 
issues – less than one in ten thousand. Several high-profile bankruptcies during the Great Recession caught 
the public imagination, particularly Detroit, San Bernardino, and Stockton, but even during the worst 
economic crisis in a century public defaults hovered at only 0.15%. This compares very favorably to a 
corporate default rate of just under 7% during the same period (Moody’s, 2017). 
  There is far less scholarship around whether debt is a good idea for cities in the first place, but 
some studies from divergent fields of inquiry imply there may be issues beyond the irresponsibility of 
spendthrift bad apples. Pascarella & Raymond (1982) find that bonds to support economic development 
in Ohio did nothing to reduce unemployment. Bland & Laositiat (1997) find that increased debt service 
expenditures decreased operating expenditures in Texas cities. Pacewicz (2012) writes about a class of 
redevelopment officials who bounce from debt-financed project to debt-financed project as career 
springboards. These officers often issued unsustainable debts since they did not anticipate staying at any 
given city for long.  
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 The mechanisms of debt may foster racial inequality. Emerging research shows that majority Black 
cities and public institutions pay higher interest rates than majority white counterparts, even when 
controlling for other factors. This gap widened significantly in the lead-up to the Great Recession (Ponder, 
2017; Dougal et al., 2018). 
 There are also plenty of stories of outright corruption circulating municipal debt issues. Banks have 
been caught rigging auctions for the right to participate in borrowing, ultimately taking millions of extra 
dollars from cities (Taibbi, 2012).4 Banks also have manipulated interest rates by withholding information 
from cities (McBride, 2016),5 used swaps to hedge their own positions at the expense of governments 
(Bhatti & Sloan, 2016), and charged similar borrowers wildly different fees for issuance (Joffe, 2015).  
 Most troubling is scholarship around ratings agencies. Higher credit ratings ensure lower 
borrowing costs for a city. There are only three market-legible credit rating firms in the United States. 
Hackworth (2002) explores dynamics between cities and bond rating agencies and finds that cities have cut 
public sector wages or benefits to impress ratings agencies. The credit ratings industry itself admits the 
individual rater has a large amount of discretion in determining creditworthiness and that the perceptions 
of intangible management prowess fit into the determination (Lipnick et al, 1999). Using regression 
analysis, one study tried to get to the bottom of how these ratings are set, and ultimately determined that 
raters’ perceptions about city management play a major role, implying that city officials are not wrong to 
believe that following a rater’s roadmap could lead to a better assessment (Ammar et al., 2001). 
 Given these problems, why do cities play the game at all? The obvious answer – they need money, 
of course! – does not get to the root of the issue. Urban geographers have spent more time examining this 
                                                          
4 This scam is incredibly complex and beyond the scope of the study, but I will provide a brief summary. When cities borrow 
money, they rarely spend it all at once. Instead of letting that money sit around, cities often park it in a bank and withdraw it as 
they need it. Banks compete to manage that unspent money in exchange for paying interest to the city. By rigging auctions, the 
banks could keep that interest rate artificially low – often only by a few basis points (a basis point is one hundredth of one 
percent). For million-dollar deals, this adds up. For hundreds of individual million-dollar deals, it adds up a lot. The scam went on 
for years without anyone even noticing. Because of the complex nature of the scheme, no one fully knows the scale of the theft. 
5 The so-called LIBOR scandal. 
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question. Leitner (1990) proposes that cities are living in a new age of intense inter-urban competition, 
similar to the entrepreneurial age discussed in Chapter 1 (Monkkonen, 1984; Sbragia, 1996). The 
hallmarks of this new competitive age are devolved responsibilities from higher levels of government 
combined with greater pressure to pursue economic development schemes in competition with neighboring 
cities. Hackworth (2007) argues this includes a mandate for local governments to act like private 
businesses and focus on profitability. Miller & Hokenstad (2014) place the blame on decreased support 
from higher levels of government for social support programs, as a part of a broader dismantling of the 
welfare state. In the case of California, one study argues that the community redevelopment agency (RDA) 
system, which dissolved in 2012, had accelerated this entrepreneurial streak, leading many cities to borrow 
amounts which were ultimately unsustainable when the Recession hit (Davidson & Ward, 2013). 
 These combined forces – less support for social welfare programs, increased focus on 
competitiveness and economic development between cities, and lower tax revenues – have pushed cities to 
embrace an open-armed bond market (Peck, 2014).  
 Studies of financialization and urban austerity have articulated a detailed framework for 
understanding trends in the political economy at the level of the city. However, they largely ignore a key 
aspect of the city – as a direct employer of a significant percentage of workers. Those austerity studies 
which do explore effects on communities and the workforce tend to approach the question from a national 
perspective (Blyth, 2013). 
 Jamie Peck is one of the few theorists in this group to raise the issue of local public sector labor. In 
one study, he notes that public sector employment levels dropped drastically during the Great Recession, 
and had failed to recover – unlike from most other major modern-era downturns, which actually saw 
increased public employment (Peck, 2012). In another, he argues organizations like American Legislative 
Exchange Council (ALEC) and the Manhattan Institute have been promoting municipal bankruptcy as a 
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viable way to curb organized workers and reduce labor costs (Peck, 2014).6 Peck does not take the next 
step and explore what these conditions mean for actual working people on the ground. 
 Without answering the question of who does this work, why they do it, and what is the effect of 
job quantity or quality reduction on communities, these authors inadvertently reinforce the role of the city 
as a service provider and not as a holistic entity that also employs many people. The city is not merely a 
lived-in political entity; it is a major employer that drives local or regional labor markets. This school of 
thought also ignores unions as key actors in the political economy, relegating workers and their 
organizations to the role of faceless casualties. 
 In an almost opposite problem, labor studies scholars have studied the effects of the economic 
downturn on public sector workers, but largely ignore the mechanisms of city-level belt tightening, just 
blaming it on the economic downturn itself. Several studies document the effects of the Great Recession on 
government workers. They show that because of fiscal constraints, most local governments responded to 
the crisis by squeezing workers. Fully one half of local governments either froze or reduced wages, 40% 
reduced the number of civil service jobs, and over two-thirds intentionally did not fill positions to bridge 
budget gaps (Warner, 2012). Many cities also made cuts to benefits, particularly pensions. These benefit 
cuts made it harder for the public sector to retain workers through the recovery (Quinby & Wettstein, 
2019).  
 But labor academics have been slow to examine the role of austerity on urban finance and how it 
changes bargaining dynamics. Fanelli (2014) is a notable exception, though writing in the Canadian 
context about city collective bargaining in Toronto.   
 Some non-academic researchers have examined the intersection of Wall Street financial firms and 
cities (Bhatti, 2014, for example), but unions have been slow to pick up the issue. Tentative efforts by 
                                                          
6 While several cities did go bankrupt during the Great Recession, and union contracts do generally re-open during a bankruptcy, 
the argument by ALEC and the Manhattan Institute is not necessarily the cause of the bankruptcies.  
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labor to address this issue have not panned out (Bhatti, 2015). Community groups concerned about 
finance are looking to municipal banking to solve the problem (Beitel, 2016), but unions have not 
embraced this tactic in full. Neither has the general public, which voted in 2018 against changing the city 
charter in Los Angeles to allow a municipal bank as a workaround to borrowing from financial institutions 
(Koren, 2018). 
 This study will shed light on the effects of city borrowing on collective bargaining outcomes and 
bridge the gap between austerity urbanism and unions.    
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 As municipal debt burden increases, do union public sector wages decrease? Cities have a limited 
amount of money to spend on core functions, circumscribed by revenues which fluctuate with economic 
conditions beyond any given city’s immediate control. Using statistical analysis, this study shows that as 
one expenditure category (debt service payments) increases, another category (public sector wages) 
decreases. Supplementary qualitative data indicate that unions may not be paying much attention to this 
dynamic. 
 I evaluate the question by looking at a population of 217 cities from 8 counties of Southern 
California: Imperial, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, Santa Barbara, and 
Ventura counties (see Chapter 4 for detailed descriptive statistics; Appendix A contains a list of all cities in 
the population). I selected California for three main reasons. First, public sector unionization is relatively 
high in California. Since I seek to explore the possible effects on collective bargaining, a high degree of 
unionization is key. Second, California has a high degree of fiscal transparency when it comes to local 
governments. The State Controller requires cities to report detailed expenditure and compensation data, 
and makes several useful raw data sets available. Third, in California schools are politically and fiscally 
independent from cities and are run out of school districts. Although school finance and compensation for 
school employees is a key issue, my question is focused on more traditional city-type jobs and bonds. By 
looking at an area where schools can effectively be put to the side, I can closely examine the dynamics I 
wish to uncover without the myriad other issues surrounding the educational system. 
 I chose a sub-region of California to avoid any region-specific effects, such as the dot com boom 
of the early 2000s which disproportionately affected the Northern California economy, or the vagaries of 
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California’s agricultural sector. Southern California is the nation’s most populous region, spanning multiple 
counties and a huge geography. It includes on primate city, another large primary city, multiple second-tier 
cities, and hundreds of smaller municipalities. There are suburbs, exurbs, and rural communities in this 
sample. Such variety makes for a nice heterogenous blend of sizes and types of city. 
 This study uses four dependent variables to evaluate the relationship between debt burden and city 
wages. The primary dependent variable is salary expenditures as a percentage of total city expenditures. By 
using this value, I can evaluate salaries as a relative priority for a city’s budget compared to other 
expenditure categories. The variable does not, however, capture any effects on individual workers, either 
present or future. The study thus also uses three starting annual wage rates for select municipal jobs as 
subordinate dependent variables. By examining these wages, I can evaluate the relationship between debt 
burden and future worker compensation levels in a given city, and eliminate the possibility that cities just 
hire less staff.  
 The treatment I want to measure is debt burden. I use debt service as a percentage of total 
expenditures as my primary independent variable. There is an obvious issue with using variables which 
measure percentages of a common value – in this case, two percentages of total city expenditures. When 
one increases, the other decreases assuming a constant total amount. I use these variables anyway, because I 
want to measure what trade-off cities make when they take on large debt burdens. Debt service payments 
are inflexible, perhaps the most rigid expenditure category in a city’s budget. Cities must pay for debt 
service out of existing revenue streams, and there is never a guarantee that taking on debt will increase those 
streams. Regardless, cities have to find the money to pay somewhere. Since I want to measure the 
relationship between this trade-off and spending on public sector workers specifically, it seems like an 
adequate way to see if the tradeoff is at least partially coming from salary expenditures instead of other 
flexible parts of a city’s total expenditure.  
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However, I also explore a few other accepted debt burden markers as subordinate dependent 
variables. There is no single accepted variable for measuring debt burden, so multiple variables are available. 
I test several in order to verify the robustness of the relationship. This is particularly important given my 
primary variables suffer from both being percentages of a common whole; fluctuations intrinsically shift the 
other. I return to the issues with percentage-based variables and other debt burden markers below in my 
descriptions of each variable. 
 Lastly, the models introduce a number of control variables, including collective bargaining agent, 
fiscal data, county, and proxies for community union support and community progressivism. I will define 
each of these variables in turn, and the methodology I use in their assembly, in the coming section. 
 The following section explores the variables I use in my regression models in greater detail. First, I 
explore each of the variables in greater detail, explaining the origin of the data and any issues I foresee with 
the variable. I close the chapter by laying out the regression equations. 
 
Data/Measurement 
Debt Burden (Independent Variable) 
 Measuring debt burden is complicated, since so many other factors besides overborrowing can alter 
absolute debt values. A city the size of Needles (pop. 5000) compared to one the size of Los Angeles (pop. 
3.8 Million) are going to have radically different debt profiles just by virtue of their relative sizes. Debt 
also changes over time, as cities borrow new debt or retire old debt. Although bonded debt is typically 
amortized, the size of payments can fluctuate depending on the structure or terms of the loan. Aberrations 
include multi-year interest-only payments or payment plans similar to the now infamous balloon mortgages 
used in the lead-up to the Great Recession. In addition, some unique Southern California cities have 
relatively ‘normal’ debt burdens but very small populations since they rely on an industrial base, not a base 
of people, for survival (more on these cities below).  
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 As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is no single accepted value used in accounting circles to measure 
debt burden. For this study, I thus attempt a variety of debt burden markers which are all accepted 
measurements.  
 My primary source of data to measure debt burden is the California State Controller’s Cities Raw 
Data, which includes data from Fiscal Years 2003-2016. Every year, cities must complete a Financial 
Transactions Report and submit it to the State Controller, who compiles the information in a publicly 
available unprocessed spreadsheet.  
 My main variable for measuring debt burden is debt service expenditures as a percentage of total 
expenditures. I chose this marker because it shows in the most basic way what percent of a city’s budget 
goes to pay the debt service as a relative priority versus other expenditure categories. Drawing from the 
California State Controller Cities Raw Data set, I pulled the values in nominal dollars for both debt service 
and total expenditures, and put the two values in a ratio.  
 The numerator, debt service expenditures, includes both payments toward the principle and 
interest on bonded debt. The value also includes lease obligations – at first blush a seemingly broad 
category. Lease obligations are key because they include those leases used to secure special authority lease 
revenue bonds (see Chapter 1 for details on this type of financing). However, it might also include such 
mundane costs as the leasing of a photocopier. The California State Controller demands that cities report 
only those leases which have a lease term of at least 10 years, and which involve the city resuming 
ownership of the property at the end of the lease – both common features of a lease revenue bond 
arrangement (California State Controller’s Office, 2016). This should eliminate most spurious lease 
activity from the reported debt service values. 
The debt service expenditure value does not include any debt service from Mello-Roos or 
Community Facilities bonds or a few other types of rare debt obligations. (California State Controller’s 
Office, 2016).  
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 The denominator comes from the same dataset and includes operating expenditures, capital outlay, 
and debt service (California State Controller’s Office, 2016).  
 The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommends debt service as a percentage 
of total expenditures as a debt burden indicator because it eliminates “budgetary and accounting 
idiosyncrasies,” like special debt service funds which some cities establish to mask just how much their debt 
loads are costing them (Miranda & Picur, 2008). In order to respond to possible arguments that it is unfair 
to measure principal along with interest, I point out that complicated borrowing instruments may change 
the ratio between these two variables very drastically (as in balloon-type loans). In addition, the ratio itself 
naturally moves toward principal as the loan ages due to amortization – as the principal gets smaller, so 
does interest, and the amount dedicated to the principal in each payment naturally rises. Thus, although the 
State Controller data would allow me to measure either interest or principal payments, the effect on the 
city is mostly dependent on where the obligation falls in a long-term series of obligations (assuming an 
amortized loan, the most common scenario) and will naturally fall or rise as time goes on, potentially 
adding another effect into my regression model. In addition, this would cut out the common lease revenue 
bonds, which are reported neither as principle or as interest. Thus, it is best to simply track the two 
together – after all, a dollar spent on debt service is one less dollar spent on other categories, whether it 
goes to interest or principal. 
 Comparing debt service expenditures as a percentage of all expenditures versus salary expenditures 
over the same denominator might create complications. For example, if a city began a new big-ticket 
project or program, the size of the total expenditure pie would increase drastically, decreasing values for the 
independent and dependent variables although actual expenditures in these categories did not change. In 
addition, a large fluctuation in one of the two variables could drastically change the other on paper without 
a change in dollar expenditures. For example, if a city laid off a large part of its staff, salary expenditures 
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would drop drastically, reducing total expenditures. Debt service would appear to grow since the total 
expenditure pie shrinks, even if no additional money is being spent on debt servicing.  
 To avoid this concern, I analyze debt burden in a few other commonly accepted measurements and 
run them in independent regressions with my primary independent variable to check for a common 
negative relationship. All of these variables must control for city size in some way.  
 One such variable is debt service per capita – essentially, how many dollars in debt service payment 
does a city make per resident. Calculating this variable posed some challenges. I adjusted debt service 
payments, the same numerator from above, for inflation using Bureau of Labor Statistics values into 2016 
real dollars. For the denominator, I pulled population figures for each city in the study from the US 
Census Bureau. Unfortunately, the Census only started the American Community Survey (ACS) in 2005, 
meaning for all cities there is a gap in data between the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2005 ACS values 
(recall the debt dataset begins in 2003). In addition, the ACS did not originally cover all cities. Many 
smaller cities were phased in at various times throughout the 2000s as legible places for the ACS. For all 
gaps in data, I simply made linear extrapolations between the 2000 Decennial Census population figure 
and the first available year for the ACS. I then adjust to per million residents to avoid a very low 
coefficient.  
 This marker suffers outliers. Some cities exhibit very small populations but have relatively ‘normal’ 
budgets. Places like Vernon and the City of Industry in Los Angeles are two such examples. Both have 
robust budgets, supported by large industrial bases within city limits. Yet both have tiny populations – 
under 200 residents each (Vernon hovers around 80). This creates an astronomical debt service per capita 
value due to the very small denominator of the ratio – measurements which would be doom for ‘normal’ 
cities, but really are not too bad given the tax base enjoyed by these special cases. Some other small cities 
also showed large, though not as extreme, values. To control for this, I eliminated all cities under 3,000 
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residents for the regressions which use this debt burden marker. At this threshold, I eliminate all extreme 
outliers. Appendix A includes a list of cities which I cut through this process. 
 My last two debt burden variables measure the debt service payments against various types of 
revenue streams. A commonly accepted measurement of debt looks at debt service over property tax 
revenues (Miranda & Picur, 2008). Since property tax revenues are the surest and largest revenue stream for 
most cities, this marker tells how well a city can weather a debt burden in the worst-case scenario of all 
other streams drying up. Since this is a standard accounting practice for measuring debt burden, it seems 
prudent to use it. The same data set which contains my numerator, the California State Controller Raw 
Cities data, also has a value for property tax revenues, so I just put them in a ratio.  
 While using property tax revenues as a benchmark to evaluate a city’s debt burden might make 
sense in 49 states, the vagaries of Proposition 13 make California a unique situation. Property tax revenues 
in California are highly distorted post-Jarvis, and California cities rely on other revenue streams more 
heavily than in other states (Alamo & Whitaker, 2012). To account for this, I use a final debt burden 
marker – debt service payments in a ratio with total revenues. The total revenue value comes from the same 
California State Controller Raw Cities data set, and again I put them it in a ratio with debt service. 
 By using four separate measurements to evaluate debt burden, I intend to counter any argument 
that a specific measurement is distorted in some other way. I acknowledge that these variables are likely to 
be correlated, and in fact they are (see Chapter 4, Descriptive Statistics for a closer look). There are a few 
reasons for this, but in the main, all four variables are supposed to measure the same phenomenon – debt 
burden. This commonality of purpose is precisely why they are all accepted measurements of debt burden. 
The numerator in each is identical, and the denominator is going to be similar for two (revenues and 
expenditures should ideally be pretty close), and highly related for two more (property tax revenues should 
not fluctuate too much within city year to year as a percentage of total revenues). While there might be 
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more creative ways of measuring debt, for this study I have opted to stick with the variables recommended 
by the GFOA and acknowledge this potential weakness. 
 Some accepted debt burden measurements look at total debt, instead of debt service – the amount 
owed, not the annual flows of money devoted to paying it off. I eschewed this approach for a number of 
reasons. For one, the data are not as accessible as debt service. The California State Controller Raw Cities 
dataset does include a list of all bonds and their outstanding values, but the data is not reported as clearly 
and concisely as debt service, which has to be accounted for more tightly since it involves cash flows. 
Second, measuring debt does not account for interest, a key feature of debt service. Cities do not get equal 
interest rates, and some research (see Chapter 2) indicates that discriminatory forces may influence the 
interest rates a city gets. I think this is an important effect to incorporate into a measurement of debt 
burden which is included in debt service but gets lost in total debt. Finally, debt payments tend to be 
amortized. Although some cities do borrow such that they pay interest only, for the most part cities 
decrease the principal owed annually in a plottable line, but the debt service remains constant for the life of 
the debt. I feared this would distort the usefulness of any variable relying on raw debt in a regression.  
 
Salary Expenditures 
 I opted to use salary as a percentage of total expenditures for my dependent variable in my primary 
regression. Although salary expenditures could also be measured against several other control variables, 
much like debt service, I think this is the best measurement of the value a city places on compensating staff.  
 Salary expenditures per capita vary widely by community. Salary expenditures over property tax 
revenues suffer from the same tax revolt distortions as mentioned above. Salary expenditures over total 
revenue is perhaps an acceptable alternative, but since I am trying to measure the relative import a city 
accords staff salaries, the expenditure denominator just seemed like a wiser choice.  
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 This variable has some downsides. For one, cities with high degrees of outsourcing will have 
artificially low wage expenditures. Some cities outsource all or almost all of their work, so although they 
indirectly spend money on labor, it does not appear in the reporting to the Controller. That amount is lost 
using this variable. I can only counter that the purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between 
debt service and public sector employee compensation, not outsourced private sector workers doing public 
sector work, and that other salary expenditure variables would have the same problem. As there is no 
practical way to counter-act this, I will rely on city fixed effects in my regression models.  
 For another thing, salary expenditures are easily and routinely manipulated by city finance officers 
and city managers. Although individual salaries are generally fixed in the public sector, as a category salary 
expenditure constitute a highly flexible area for making ends meet. In a very common tactic, called ‘vacancy 
adjustment’ by government finance experts, essentially city officials opt not to fill funded positions when 
they become vacant or postpone hiring until a new fiscal year (Fishbein & Vehaun, 2009). Thus, a position 
which was budgeted for the entire 52 weeks of the year is only filled, say, 25 or 30 weeks of that year, 
which saves the city money. The city manager or finance director can do this over multiple vacant positions 
and suddenly any small to moderate sized budget shortfall is met, no one gets furloughed or laid off, and 
the effect on city services is ideally minimal – just a few weeks without a filled position. No one person is 
unduly hurt, but the total expenditures for the year do shrink. In more severe times of crisis, of course 
furloughs also lower salary expenditures.  
 The data also do not account for how much money individuals actually make. Senior employees 
will make more money than new employees for a similar job, particularly in unionized workplaces which 
tend to have elaborate but rigid job classification systems and salary scales. Expenditures on wages could 
thus reflect high numbers of low-wage or low-seniority workers, or low numbers of high-wage or high-
seniority workers. Of course, most cities use a mix, but the mix is different everywhere. Cities which 
contract out blue-collar jobs but have kept white-collar work in-house will also have higher average per-
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worker expenditures than cities that do not. These problems make the variable a good, but imperfect, 
tracker. I address this issue in two ways. First, I use fixed-effect variables for city which should compensate 
for each city’s unique labor force mix. By grouping my means by city, I reduce noise from the wide variety 
of labor strategies in place in the population. I also use another type of wage marker in separate regression 
analyses to evaluate the relationship between debt service and actual individual worker compensation. 
 
Wages 
 Measuring wages also poses its challenges. Cities all have different job titles, and it’s not always 
immediately obvious what any particular job title does. Municipal salaries vary widely between jobs, so 
there is no baseline. Some cities contract out more of their core functions than others.  
 This study measures wages by yearly salary for starting employees in three job categories. The 
California State Controller Government Compensation database includes employee compensation 
information for every employee of every level of government in the state from fiscal year 2009 to 2017. 
For each city and year, the Controller lists every employee by job title (employee name is not included, but 
not necessary for this study), and includes their actual compensation as well as the lowest and highest 
possible compensation for the employee’s job classification. Since the lowest value for the job classification 
would also be the starting wage, I can thus pull values by broad job categories for the years 2009 through 
2016 and compare them to the independent variables through regression analysis. 
 Every city has a somewhat different employee mix, and cities often title jobs differently even if core 
job functionalities are roughly the same. In order to keep things manageable, I selected the three most 
common job categories in Southern California cities.  
 To identify what these were, I performed a selection process. For the 2017 fiscal year, I sorted data 
from all cities in the eight Southern California counties of my population. Because I am looking for the 
most common job titles, I reasoned that large cities would have many more job titles by virtue of their 
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larger workforce, and excised the 10 largest cities as measured by population from my sample. I also 
reasoned that small cities do not necessarily have a representative mix of job classifications, either by virtue 
of unusual government models (such as the industrial base cities I mention earlier) or because people may 
perform multiple tasks in a small town. In order to avoid this distortion, I also excised the 10 smallest 
cities. 
 I then randomized the remaining cities in the sample using Microsoft Excel’s random number 
generator and took the first 15 cities from the sample. For each city, I listed out every reported job 
classification in the Controller dataset. From this, I compared classifications and determined the three most 
common ones. Table 3.1 shows the results of this experiment. 
 
Table 3.1 – Job Category Frequency from a Random Sample of 15 Southern California Cities. 
Job Title Number of Appearances (out of 15 in sample) 
Administrative Assistant 14 
Maintenance Worker 14 
Code Compliance Inspector 13 
Associate Planner 11 
Mechanic 10 
 
 For these 15 cities, three job classifications were the most common – Maintenance Worker, 
Administrative Assistant, and Code Compliance Inspector (14, 14, and 13 cities had job categories with 
reported wage values, respectively).7 Associate Planner and Mechanic came in 4th and 5th place (11 and 10 
cities reported wages for these job categories, respectively). The top three encompass a nice split of wage 
                                                          
7 I did not include titles like City Manager, Attorney, Engineer, or Treasurer for this survey. I also excluded city councilmembers 
and mayors. 
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levels and skills. Administrative assistants tend to be low-to-mid-wage white collar workers. Maintenance 
work is low-pay and blue-collar. Code compliance is relatively high-skill high-pay work, and falls 
somewhere between blue and white-collar work.  
 I then returned to the dataset, pulling all information from the years 2009 and 2016. Since the 
Raw Cities dataset does not include budget data for fiscal year 2017, the wages from that year do not help 
since I would not be able to control for my variable of interest – debt. After filtering for cities in my 8-
county population, I began pulling starting wage values per job classification. 
 Cities can title similar jobs differently.  This created a number of potential pitfalls for pulling data. 
I had to use some criteria to separate out jobs for each classification. I now explain my methodology for 
each of the three job classification sorting processes. 
 The Administrative Assistant category was the most complicated. My aim was to select the lowest-
paid most entry-level administrative assistant position possible – someone who performs routine office 
work with limited amounts of discretion. The titles for this position vary widely from city to city and 
sometimes within city between departments. I eliminated any job title which appeared to include 
managerial functions using the markers lead, senior, or manager in the job title as a condition for striking. I 
also struck any job titles which included the word ‘tech’ or ‘technician’ or ‘analyst.’ Though some cities may 
classify administrative assistants as technicians, the term implies extra skills or job responsibilities which fall 
beyond what I aim to capture with this position category. Since I did not want to pull job descriptions for 
each city, I simply cut these. Finally, I cut any jobs which included ‘intern’ in the job title. Although I want 
entry-level positions, many cities have internship programs which are sub-entry level. For a portion of the 
period of this study, some cities did not pay interns, which would create further distortions. 
 Once these were eliminated, I selected the most likely job titles to fit the classification and ranked 
them according to preference. Table 3.2 shows all of the titles which I included for the study. I selected any 
entry which included one of these titles and saved the starting wage level. If a city had multiple jobs titles 
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which appear on this list, I selected the one highest in my preference ranking, also listed in Table 3.2. For 
example, if a city’s list of employees included both ‘Administrative Assistant’ and ‘Administrative 
Secretary,’ I always chose the former. If a city had both of my top ranked titles (i.e. ‘Administrative 
Assistant’ and ‘Administrative Aide’), I selected the lower pay title. If a city had two identical job titles 
which met my criteria but listed different starting pay levels, I selected the lower of the two. If a city had 
more than two entries with identical job titles which met my criteria, I examined them all together, and 
took the lowest value that did not appear to be an outlier. For example, a city might list ten administrative 
assistants. If all but one listed the starting wage as $30,000, and one outlier listed it as $12,000, I would 
select the more common (and higher) value. 
 
Table 3.2 – Selection Frequency & Mean Starting Wage by Job Title, Administrative Assistant 
 
Job Title Preference Level Number of Cities Using this Title in 
2016 
Mean Starting 
Annual Wage 
Administrative Assistant 1 81 $44,678 
Administrative Aide 1 19 $43,644 
Administrative Specialist 3 14 $45,812 
Administrative Secretary 4 33 $46,922 
Administrative Clerk 5 14 $36,416 
Admin Services 5 1 $48,635 
TOTAL/AVERAGE - 169 $44,426 
 
 My reasoning for my ranking system was that ‘assistant’ and ‘aide’ were roughly equivalent 
categories and were what I was seeking. Specialist could either indicate a degree of specialization above 
these jobs, or simply be a more modern way of accounting for the nature of administrative work. Thus I 
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ranked it lower than the other two positions; I would only select this job if no assistant or aide were 
available. Similarly, ‘secretary’ could imply a higher degree of confidence and commensurate compensation, 
or it could just be an old-fashioned way of talking about an administrative assistant. I only used this title if 
none of the earlier titles were available. Secretary overlapped the most with other titles, so was selected less. 
Finally, some cities had no administrative support besides either ‘clerk’ or ‘services.’ While a clerk generally 
performs distinct roles from an administrative assistant, in the case where there was no administrative 
support in the entire city except clerks, I reasoned it was alright to include the title. ‘Administrative services’ 
is a vague title and I only accepted it if no others were available. 
 Table 3.2 also shows the mean starting wage for each classification. There is some small variation 
between job classification, particularly for cities in which I had to rely on lower tier choices, but all in all it 
is a fairly tight concentration. The overall average for all titles was $44,426 in 2016, and most of the jobs I 
selected fell close enough to this value.  
 I then went back and repeated the process for the other years in the dataset. I finally compared 
each city across years to ensure unity of job titles within city between years, dropping any records that did 
not match job titles from previous years. I adjusted those values for inflation to 2016 real dollars using 
Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  
 For code enforcement, I used a similar but simpler methodology. Most cities call code enforcement 
staff either ‘officers’ or ‘inspectors.’ Some use ‘technician’ or ‘specialist.’ Cities tended to either call the 
work ‘compliance’ or ‘enforcement;’ at least one euphemistically called the work ‘service.’8 In a few cities, 
the job had other duties. For example, two (unlucky) code compliance officers also serve as the animal 
control officer in their communities. Generally, however, there was less variation within cities for this 
position, since unlike administrative support, code compliance tends to be limited to a single department. I 
                                                          
8 One suspects violators feel more enforced than served. 
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thus did not need a complicated preference level rubric for these positions. I just took the lowest 
compensated person with a title from the rough formula: code + (enforcement/compliance) + 
(officer/inspector/technician/specialist). Table 3.3 shows the frequency of each and the average salary for 
the year 2016. 
 
Table 3.3 – Selection Frequency & Mean Starting Wage by Job Title, Code Enforcement 
 
Job Title Number of Cities Using this Title in 2016 Mean Starting  Annual Wage 
Code Compliance Officer 29 $53,563 
Code Compliance Inspector 7 $56,241 
Code Compliance 
Technician 
2 $40,058 
Code Enforcement Officer 88 $53,376 
Code Enforcement Inspector 2 $43,606 
Code Enforcement 
Technician 
2 $40,726 
Code Enforcement Specialist 2 $43,902 
Code Enforcement 3 $53,873 
Code Conformance Officer 1 $22,428 
Code Service Officer 1 $50,352 
Code Officer 1 $51,070 
Code Inspector 1 $59,834` 
TOTAL/AVERAGE 139 $52,712 
 
 There is clearly more variance in wage levels for this job category than in the administrative 
assistant category. A lot of this comes from the small sizes of the classifications – with only two 
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observations in a group, the average can be heavily swayed in either direction. With only one observation, 
the average is the solitary value. Most fall relatively close to the mean, but there are some outliers. Viewed 
as a distribution, however, the jobs form a neat bell. 
 I again pulled the same data for the previous years in the set, made sure job title was equivalent 
across years within city, and adjusted the wages to real 2016 dollars. 
 The third category of maintenance also required some processing. Starting with 2016, I first 
filtered out for a few key terms, much like I had done for administrative assistants. Since I wanted to 
capture entry-level non-managerial workers, I first pulled any job titles which spoke to a managerial 
capacity. I struck any job title which included the terms ‘manager,’ ‘coordinator,’ ‘lead,’ or ‘supervisor.’ I 
then struck any job which included ‘mechanic,’ which implied a higher-skill set of job tasks. I pulled out 
the several ‘pool’ maintenance titles as well, since it seemed likely municipal pool maintenance workers 
might be distinct from a typical city maintenance worker for a variety of reasons (most of these jobs 
showed very low pay, and I assume they were seasonal work perhaps geared towards student labor).  
 This left a broad swath of maintenance worker positions. While many cities just call this type of 
work ‘maintenance worker,’ many others differentiated between ‘building,’ ‘park,’ ‘public works,’ and ‘street’ 
maintenance. Some had slight degrees of variation between these jobs, although most paid the same across 
classifications. To be sure I was not going to be too far off, I took the average salaries for each of the three 
classifications and compared them to the average for the whole list for 2016. All four values were within 
15% of each other, so it seems safe to assume the marker did not matter much for salary when I have to 
pick between the three. I always picked a job title without such a qualifier, when possible. When not 
possible, I treated all differentiated jobs as equals since salaries varied so little between classifications, and 
opted for the lowest non-outlier value. 
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 I used a system similar to that which I used for the administrative assistant job classification 
sorting. If there were only two salaries that met my conditions, I picked the lower. If there were many, I 
picked the lowest which did not seem like a blatant outlier.  
 For many blue-collar positions, cities often use a roman numeral marker with a job title to 
differentiate steps on a salary ladder, for example, ‘Maintenance Worker I’ or ‘Maintenance Worker II.’ 
Generally, higher numbers require higher skills. Since I wanted entry level positions, I always selected ‘I’ 
jobs except in two unique circumstances. For some reason, two cities reversed the trend, with ‘II’ positions 
receiving lower pay than ‘I’ positions. While there is doubtless a marginally interesting story of the history 
of collective bargaining in this unit which led to this unusual convention, this is beyond the purview of this 
study. I simply selected the lower value. Also, several cities never had ‘I’ workers in any year during the 
period covered by the dataset. I assumed that, for whatever reason, the city hired directly into a ‘II’ position 
in these cases, effectively making this the entry-level maintenance position, and thus selected those for my 
regression model as well. 
 Table 3.4 shows the resulting jobs broken down by classification. 
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Table 3.4 – Selection Frequency & Mean Starting Wage by Job Title, Maintenance 
 
Job Title Number of Cities Using this Title in 2016 Mean Starting Annual Wage 
Maintenance Worker 117 $38,016 
Street Maintenance Worker 16 $40,951 
Parks Maintenance Worker 11 $41,019 
Public Works Maintenance Worker 8 $39,278 
General Maintenance Worker 4 $37,346 
Facilities Maintenance Technician 3 $41,846 
Facilities Maintenance Worker 2 $27,321 
Building Maintenance Worker 3 $41,925 
Construction & Maintenance Worker 3 $35,670 
Maintenance Technician 2 $38,415 
Maintenance Laborer 2 $33,576 
Maintenance Specialist 1 $28,631 
Grounds Maintenance Worker 1 $29,786 
Landscape Maintenance Worker 1 $44,788 
TOTAL 174 $38,382 
 
 There may initially appear to be a premium on classifying workers as specialized maintenance. 
Most fall close to the total average value, and the difference in size can easily be attributed to the small 
number in each sample.  
 Once again, I pulled values for previous years, normalized across job titles between years, and 
adjusted salaried to 2016 real dollars.  
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Control Variables 
 Several key variables affect both the independent and dependent variables. The economic cycle has 
a dramatic effect across all economic actors, including cities. The main economic downturn during the time 
period in question is the Great Recession. I analyze a sub-region of California, Southern California, since 
the geography was more or less evenly and strongly affected by the Great Recession.  
 I use both city and year fixed effects in my analyses. The year fixed effect will control for the 
economic cycle, which should affect most cities more or less equally in the Southern California region. The 
earliest data will capture the tail end of the Dot Com Bubble Recession, though the impact of this 
recession was relatively limited in Southern California. The Great Recession falls squarely in the middle of 
my data for city expenditures and revenues, and was a major downturn in Southern California. Finally, I 
will track through the recovery period of the 2010s.  
 City fixed effects will capture idiosyncratic aspects of city finance which cannot be measured 
otherwise – varying degrees of public utility ownership, airports, compensation for city councilmembers, 
high property tax levy rates, and other things which are hard to control for individually.  
 I also will introduce control variables for population size. Cities with bigger populations may have 
larger capital expenditure needs than smaller cities, leading them to borrow more frequently or carry larger 
debt burden. I previously described my methodology for retrieving population data from the Census, using 
primarily American Community Survey values. 
 The degree of union power likely alters collective bargaining outcomes (Leap & Grigsby, 1986). 
All things being equal, better organized unions with more resources and higher member activism are more 
likely to perform better at the bargaining table. Union power is hard to measure, however. The ideal 
measurement would be to use percentage of the workforce covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 
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These data are not generally publicly available, and are in heavy flux in recent years in response to a rapidly 
changing legal landscape (I discuss this dynamic further in Chapter 5).  
 In the absence of an ideal variables, this experiment uses three proxies as measurements for union 
power – one for organizational resources, and two for community union support.  
 To control for organizational resource levels, I code results by the specific labor organization that 
represents the workforce. Southern California workers are represented by several labor organizations. There 
are four main unions which work in the regional public sector, but many smaller and single-shop unions 
also sit at the table with city officials.  
 The two primary non-federal government public sector unions in the United States are the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), and the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU). AFSCME has a decentralized model. Each bargaining unit is a separate and 
mostly staff-less local, coordinated through a heavily staffed district council which covers the entire region 
and is based in Los Angeles. This creates a myriad of small locally-run organizations which are dependent 
on a central common pool for staff. In contrast, SEIU operates two large megalocals and one smaller local 
in the Southern California region.9 The small local covers a small portion of Santa Barbara County. One 
big local covers San Diego and Imperial Counties. Although this local primarily represents workers from 
San Diego County, they also represent multiple smaller cities in the region. The biggest local pretty much 
covers everything else. Both AFSCME and SEIU are major players in my population of cities. 
                                                          
9 In the late 2000s, SEIU’s national union forcibly consolidated a number of smaller locals into larger single entities, with the 
intent of fostering more regional power. This was easily one of the most controversial programs of the union’s General President 
Andy Stern, actually exploding into open conflict in several sectors and geographies of the country. Where you fell on the 
question became a sort of litmus test for all kinds of other opinions about the direction labor should take, and for a time may have 
cost you a lot of friends. For the purposes of this study, Stern’s program peacefully merged multiple different public sector locals 
from Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, Santa Barbara, and Ventura Counties – seven locals into one new entity, Local 721. If you 
do not get it, reread the last sentence out loud. Similarly, two San Diego and Imperial County locals were merged into one, Local 
221.  
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 A large regional union, the Orange County Employees Association (OCEA), represents both 
county and city employees exclusively in Orange County. Little known outside the county, the union is 
independent from any national union but is a powerful actor in Orange County public sector unionism and 
politics.  
 The International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) represents a number of cities in Antelope 
Valley and the Inland Empire through several distinct locals. Though not generally known for being a 
public sector union, the IBT does have a very distinct niche in the region. Teamsters Local 1932 from San 
Bernardino County in particular is engaged in innovative strategies around improving tax revenue streams 
for the county and area cities.  
 Many public sector bargaining units have formed independent locals, meaning workers have 
organized amongst themselves and are not affiliated with a larger labor union. Members sometimes call 
these ‘associations,’ but since they engage in collective bargaining, they are essentially unions in all but 
name. There is a trade-off in forming a small parochial labor organization. On the one hand, members have 
a higher degree of control over structural issues, like the rate of dues or bargaining tactics, and day-to-day 
issues, such as how to handle particular grievances. On the other hand, small independent unions cannot 
draw on resources from a larger organization in times of stress or when there is need for specialized 
assistance, since they typically do not have the resources to hire full-time staff support.  
 Many independent unions in Southern California try to mitigate the problems of independence by 
contracting with the City Employees Associates (CEA), a management services firm that supports client 
unions in many ways that are very analogous to a larger union. Typical services include bargaining support, 
grievance management, member recruitment, and legal advice. For many independent unions, the CEA 
provides a balance between maintaining local control and providing larger technocratic solutions to 
infrequent labor relations issues. For the purposes of this study, I classified all units which contract with 
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the CEA as if the firm was a national union.10 I expressly note that many of these client units are white-
collar or professional bargaining units.  
 Finally, I have two catch-all groups of organized bargaining units. One includes all cities which 
negotiate with any AFL-CIO affiliated union besides AFSCME.11 The AFL-CIO is the largest labor 
federation in the United States, made up of dozens member national and international unions which are 
equivalents to AFSCME, SEIU, or the IBT. If, for whatever quirk of history, a primarily private sector 
nation-wide labor organization organized a sundry public sector unit in Southern California, they fall into 
this category. These patterns reflect the relational nature of unionization. Say you decide to form a union 
but are unfamiliar with the alphabet soup of acronyms and numbers which characterize labor 
differentiation. You call a friend who is in a union. They put you in touch with their union rep, and after 
whatever degree of struggle you form a union with your co-workers. If your friend happens to work at, say, 
the ports, you may end up affiliated to a union which typically represents logistics workers even if you are a 
government employee. Notably, workers in the city of Long Beach are represented by the International 
Association of Machinists (IAM), a union which typically organizes heavy industrial workshops (think 
Boeing). A few other cities have similarly inexplicable collective bargaining relationships. This category also 
includes skilled publicly-employed construction workers, typically electricians organized under the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Since these units were rare, I lumped them together with 
the former group in a category, ‘Other AFL.’ 
 The final category includes all independent unions which are not affiliated with any larger labor 
organization and do not contract with the CEA for services. I call these ‘Other Independent.’ My baseline 
for the regressions will be units without a union. 
                                                          
10 For simplicity’s sake, I also refer to CEA as a ‘union’ in coming paragraphs, although it is not a union. 
11 Though AFSCME is affiliated with the AFL-CIO, my intention with this variable is to capture what other unions are up to, not 
the relative value of AFL-CIO affiliation. SEIU and IBT belong to a different labor federation, Change to Win. OCEA is not 
affiliated with a national labor federation. As mentioned above, locals which contract with CEA are by definition unaffiliated. 
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 Many cities bargain with multiple unions, particularly large cities which may even have multiple 
unions in a single department. For example, the City of Los Angeles has contracts with AFSCME, SEIU, 
and several other unions. Thus, some cities fall into several of these categories. Also, just because one 
bargaining unit is represented, some workers may be left out – in other words, a mark for the union does 
not necessarily mean a city’s workforce is 100% union.  
 To find data on which union represents which workforces, I used the internet. I first went to the 
websites for the major unions which represented workers in this area – AFSCME, SEIU, IBT, OCEA, and 
CEA. Most of these organizations list which bargaining units they represent. I coded each city on a list of 
all cities for representation. I then went to all cities which did not come up in one of these searches. For 
each, I did a series of google searches, seeking out either a collective bargaining agreement or wage table for 
the city. The vast majority of California cities post their collective bargaining agreements on-line, typically 
on their human resources webpage. I would pull these agreements one by one and look at the counter-party 
to the city, and code each accordingly. For independent organizations or associations, if they were not 
listed on CEA’s webpage as a client, I coded them as Other Independent. If, after exhaustive searching, I 
could find no indication that a city’s employees were represented by a union (or if their human resources 
website indicated that they were union free), I coded them as ‘Non-Union.’  
 For the purposes of this study, I did not account for police or firefighter unions. These 
organizations represent high-wage high-skill workers, have very distinct bargaining patterns and generally 
high degrees of relative power when bargaining with a city. Workers in these departments are represented 
by a union with much higher frequency than other jobs, even in many states which ban collective 
bargaining for all other public sector workers (Reaves, 2007; Wolfe & Schmitt, 2018). However, these 
services are also frequently contracted out by cities, generally to the county. The values are thus included in 
the salary expenditure variable, but not in individual annual wage regression models.  
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 I also wanted to measure the relative openness to unions within a community. To do this, I use 
two proxy values sourced from electoral decisions – one to measure specific levels of community support 
for unions, and one for broader centrist or leftist political preferences which in theory should indicate less 
anti-union or anti-worker sentiment in a community. Local policy-makers may have noted these votes as a 
key political preference of their constituents. In theory this should transform into easier conditions at the 
bargaining table, potentially increasing salaries or wages.    
 The first variable relies on two anti-union ballot measures attempting to pass so-called ‘paycheck 
deception’ or ‘paycheck protection’ statutes in California. While the complex details of paycheck deception 
efforts are beyond the scope of this project, essentially the propositions would have restricted how unions 
engage in political races and collect dues. Their sole function is a restriction on union political activity and 
union finances, and thus they serve as a good plebiscite on how a given community feels about unions in 
general. These types of measures were very common nationwide throughout a roughly 15-year period 
starting in the late 1990s (Lafer, 2014).  
 California actually saw the very first attempt at paycheck deception nationwide, in 1998 (Lafer, 
2014). The measure was defeated, but proponents tried to pass it twice more in the following two decades. 
In 2005, Proposition 75 made the ballot, one of a package of propositions supported by new Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger. The proposition was defeated, with 53.5% of voters voting no (California 
Secretary of State, 2005). The next effort came with Proposition 32 in 2012, which again lost with 56.6% 
of voters voting no (California Secretary of State, 2012). These two propositions thus give snapshots into 
how voters felt about unions in their communities at these two points in time.  
 I pulled data from the California Secretary of State about each of these elections and filtered for 
‘no’ votes by community. I pulled out a few small population cities (for example, one city went from 25% 
voting no to 100% voting no between the two samples because very few people voted), and interpolated 
between the two points for every intervening year. I then extrapolated these values outside of each point on 
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the same slope throughout the period covered by my economic data for a union support proxy. In order to 
counter any argument that extrapolation beyond the poles is reckless, I point out that the extension of the 
line is only by a few years on either side (two years at the early end and four at the late), and that annual 
variance is small – less than one percentage point per year in two-thirds of my population, and less than 
two percentage points per year for the rest. To counter this assumption, however, I also run regression 
models with only interpolated lines between the two years, and single-year regressions for each year. The 
following chapter will further detail how I used this control variable in my regression model analyses. 
 For the other proxy variable, I used a similar methodology to control for shifting political 
preferences in California as they manifested in the cities of my selection. Support for the Democratic Party 
does not necessarily equate support for unions. There are many Republican union members and even 
activists, and many Democrats who are far from friendly to worker movements in general or specific unions 
in particular. Nonetheless, unions tend to endorse and support Democratic candidates. Unions finance 
Democratic candidates more frequently, though it is difficult to measure exactly how much given the 
complicated pathways of campaign finance rules. They also run ground mobilization campaigns for 
candidates at election-time.12 The California Labor Federation, for example, overwhelmingly endorsed 
Democratic Party candidates in both of the most recent elections (2016 and 2018) for California State 
Assembly, California State Senate, and the US House of Representative races (California Labor Federation, 
2016; California Labor Federation, 2018). Table 3.5 shows a breakdown of endorsement patterns. 
  
                                                          
12 I draw on my fifteen years of experience as a practitioner in the labor movement in making this assessment. 
41 
 
Table 3.5 – Political Endorsements, California Labor Federation 
 
 Race Democrat Republican No Endorsement Total Races 
20
16
 
US House 46 1 6 53 
CA Senate 16 0 4 20 
CA Assembly 68 1 11 80 
20
18
 
US House 48 1 4 53 
CA Senate 17 0 3 20 
CA Assembly 59 3 18 80 
 
 Support for Democratic candidates in a community could thus serve as an indirect proxy for 
support of organized labor – or a measure of the get-out-the-vote power of the labor movement in that 
city. 
 In addition, preferences for the Democratic Party at a local level could signal preferences for more 
city services, which might lead to more city employees. 
 Measuring voting patterns poses challenges. At the local level, city council and mayoral positions 
are nonpartisan by law (California Constitution Article II §6), so examining city-level races by party 
identification is not an option. State Assembly and State Senate Seats, and United States House of 
Representative seats, can cross multiple small jurisdictions. In contrast, large jurisdictions like Los Angeles 
or San Diego may have many such seats, which each reflect something closer to neighborhood-level voter 
preference. This leaves only state-wide contests as viable choices for measuring voter preference for 
Democratic Party values. All communities are voting on the same candidates in these contests, so issues of 
comparability are for the most part controlled. 
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 In California, the United States Senate seats show immense incumbent advantage. Senator Diane 
Feinstein has been in office since 1992 (Feinstein, nd), and former Senator Barbara Boxer served in the US 
Senate from 1993 to 2017 (Boxer, nd). Thus, both US Senators served throughout the entire sample 
period, and enjoyed incumbency for at least a decade before the earliest financial data available from my 
other datasets. For this reason, I decided to use other state-wide positions. 
 The governor’s race has been more heavily contested in recent California years. In 2006, 
incumbent Arnold Schwarzenegger beat Democrat Phil Angelides. Angelides captured only 39% of the 
statewide vote (California Secretary of State, 2006). In 2010, Democrat Jerry Brown took the governor’s 
seat with 53.8% of the statewide vote (California Secretary of State, 2010). And in 2014, as an incumbent, 
Brown was re-elected, taking 60.0% of the state vote (California Secretary of State, 2014). I use these three 
points as my control points for the regression models. I then used two linear interpolations between the 
central point, 2010, and each other point, and extrapolate those out through the remainder of my sample. 
There is substantially more annual variance in percentages in this proxy than in my union proxy, and as 
such the extrapolations are perhaps of limited worth. I run both interpolation and extrapolation models 
below. This is admittedly an imperfect model, but with that acknowledgement there has been a significant 
increase in support for the Democratic Party and its policies within the State of California during the 
period of this study.  
 Chapter 4 will describe in greater detail how I fit these examples into my regression analyses. 
 I also introduced markers for county to use as dummies in the regressions to control for sub-
regional variations.  
 Chapter 4 contains descriptive statistics for each of these variables. 
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Quantitative Methods 
 I have financial data for 13 years (2003-2016) and starting wage data for 7 years (2009-2016). I 
use ordinary least squares multivariate regression models with debt service as a percentage of total 
expenditures as my primary independent variable for each of my four dependent variables – salary 
expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures, and 2016 real starting wage for three job classifications. 
I then add control variables to test whether this relationship holds. 
 I run multiple distinct regression models. There is one regression for each dependent variable. The 
base regression model is identical in terms of control variables across the four dependent variables, but I 
experiment with alternative measures of the importance of debt service (see below). The regression for 
wage expenditures is as follows (Formula 3.1): 
 
Formula 3.1 
𝑊𝐸௜,௝,௞,௟ =  𝑏ଵ𝐷𝑆 +  𝑏ଶ𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦௜ +  𝑏ଷ𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟௝ + 𝑏ସ𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛௞ +  𝑏଺𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦௟ +  𝑏଻𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦
+  𝑏଼𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 +  𝑏ଽ𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝑏ଵ଴ + 𝑏𝑒 
 
WE = Wage Expenditures as a % of Total Expenditures 
DS = Debt Service Expenditures as a % of Total Expenditures 
City = Fixed Effects City Control 
Year = Fixed Effects Year Control for Fiscal Year 
Union = Dummy Variable for each union 
County = Dummy Variable for each county 
DemProxy = Democratic Party Proxy Variable, yes votes for Democratic candidate for governor, linear 
extrapolations between gubernatorial races 
UnionProxy = Community union support, linear extrapolations of % of no votes in anti-union ballot 
measures 
CitySize = Population 
 
 
 In order to counter any argument that ordinary least squares regressions of a proportion may 
generate out-om-sample predictions, I check all predicted values afterwards. Though I won’t cover this for 
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each regression in the coming section, none of my regression models have produced out of sample 
predictions for my dependent variable.  
 In alternate specifications, I substitute other debt variables for debt service (DS) in my model, 
examining the relationship of increased debt service per capita, debt service over property tax revenues, and 
debt service over total revenues to my primary dependent variable, wage expenditure (WE), to see if the 
relationship is similar across the four dependent variables.  
 My research hypothesis is that increased debt service spending, however, measured, will correlate to 
decreased wage expenditures regardless of the measurement and to a statistically significant degree. A null 
finding will show no statistically-significant relationship between debt service and wage expenditures or 
individual starting wage levels.  
 
Qualitative Methods 
 Finally, I complement this quantitative analysis by including the results of four qualitative open-
ended interviews with union staff negotiators. I asked interview subjects to share their impressions about 
trends at the bargaining table over the past 15 years, differences between public and private sector 
bargaining, the effects of public debt on wages, and the relative threat of public debt compared to other 
issues facing organized labor in general and public sector unions in particular. My intention was to explore 
to what extent unions think about issues of municipal debt, their underlying reasons for their approach to 
municipal debt, and what are their outlooks for future collective bargaining efforts as a complement to the 
data. 
 I used pre-existing social networks to contact prospective interview subjects. There are limited 
organizations to choose from, so the pool of subjects is fairly small (recall that there are only 5 major labor 
organizations that operate in Southern California’s public sector; most unions employ staff who handle 
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multiple contracts). All interview subjects have multiple years’ experience bargaining in the public sector, 
both with cities and counties.  
 For three of the interviews, I spoke one-on-one with subjects. Interviews ranged from 30 minutes 
to one hour. All subjects had experience with multiple unions. Two had experience in private sector 
unionism. Two of these interviews were in person, and the third was over the phone. 
 One organization preferred to speak in a group as opposed to a single interview, a request which I 
accommodated. They provided a pool of 8 representatives who answered my questions as a group, taking 
turns to share thoughts. In all I spent approximately one hour with the group. Seven members of the group 
were experienced union staff. Many had worked in the private-sector union movement. Before moving to 
California, one participant had worked as a public sector union representative in Wisconsin when former 
governor Scott Walker initiated a series of attacks on organized labor.13 The eighth member was a staff 
attorney who had over a decade’s experience in collective bargaining. 
 
Conclusion 
 By measuring debt burden in multiple ways against a common dependent variable for salary 
expenditures, I hope to counter any arguments about idiosyncrasies of a particular independent variable by 
using multiple debt service variables. In the next chapter, I use all of these variables, adding a variety of 
control variables as well, into regression analysis to measure the correlation between debt burden and lower 
salary expenditures. I also use regression analysis to look for similar correlation with starting wage values 
pulled from a relatively new data set for three common job classifications. These variables provide various 
ways of looking at the impacts of debt burden on compensation for city employees. 
  
                                                          
13 In 2011, Scott Walker initiated a series of attacks on Wisconsin public sector unions, culminating in major protests at the state 
capital and an ultimate defeat for organized labor. Despite the loss, the fight is viewed as a pivotal moment by labor unions 
(Greenhouse, 2014).  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
 
 The multiple regression models show a clear negative relationship between salary expenditures as a 
total percentage of a city’s budget as its debt service burden rises. This relationship is evidenced even when 
controlling for city and year fixed effects, county where the municipality lies, union which represents the 
workers, proxies for union support and support for the Democratic Party in the community in question, 
and property tax revenue per capita. Though the relationship may not be dollar for dollar, cities with larger 
debt service burdens spend a smaller portion on wages. The relationship is also visible when comparing the 
same independent variable to other accepted measurements of municipal debt burden, namely debt service 
over several types of tax revenues and debt service per capita. 
 The regressions measuring relationship between the starting wage of three common employee 
classifications and debt service present a less compelling picture, but two of the models show a negative 
relationship with city debt burdens, though outside of statistical significance. For maintenance workers, 
increased debt service expenditures generally have a negative relationship to starting wage, especially when 
controlling for city and yearly fixed effects. Administrative assistants also show a similar negative 
relationship, though not as clearly. For code enforcement workers, the relationship essentially vanishes. 
This implies that low-wage workers may disproportionately bear the brunt of wage austerity through the 
Great Recession and its recovery.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the primary variables used in my regressions – debt 
service as a percentage of total city expenditures (my primary independent variable), and salary as a 
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percentage of total city expenditures (my primary dependent variable). The table also include three other 
tested dependent variables -- the real starting wage (in 2016 dollars) for three common city employee 
categories, namely Maintenance Worker, Administrative Assistant, and Code Enforcement Officer. I also 
include here three other common debt burden measurements – debt service per capita, debt service over 
property tax revenues, and debt service over all revenues. I use these three variables in distinct regressions 
with the primary independent variables to verify relationship to debt burden and control for potential 
unobserved correlative issues between the main independent and dependent variables. Table 4.1 also 
includes another key independent variable used primarily as a control in my regression models, total city 
population.  
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Table 4.1 –Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables 
 
Variable IV/DV n Mean Median Minimum Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Salary 
expenditures as 
% of total 
expenditures 
DV 2992 24.2% 23.9% 0% 58.5% 10.0 pp 
Debt service 
expenditures as 
% of total 
expenditures 
IV 2992 3.9% 2.5% 0% 60.3% 5.1 pp 
Debt service 
expenditures 
per capita 
IV 2988 $4860.59 $28.27 $0 $5,557,676 $113,846 
Debt service as 
a % of property 
tax revenues 
IV 2990 .860 .290 -22.25 151.83 3.53 
Debt service as 
a % of all 
revenues 
IV 2992 .124 .050 0 19.712 .452 
Starting wage, 
maintenance 
(real adjusted 
2016 $) 
DV 1343 $37,933 $38,568 $11,908 $55,344 $5687 
Starting wage, 
administrative 
assistant (real 
adjusted 2016 
$) 
DV 1240 $44,588 $44,773 $21,087 $75,308 $7116 
Starting wage, 
code 
enforcement 
(real adjusted 
2016 $) 
DV 1113 $52,455 $52,986 $13,287 $86,462 $7548 
Population IV 2988 87,435 48,057 41 3,918,872 273,969 
 
 Although most of these variables are normally distributed, a few show evidence of outliers. 
Population, and thus any variables that rely on population as a denominator in a per capita ratio, is highly 
skewed. The wide range of city sizes in Southern California yields a very high standard deviation for 
49 
 
population. In particular, two cities in Los Angeles County have city models which rely primarily on an 
industrial base and have very small populations; these cities spend as if they were much larger.14 In another 
anomaly, one city inexplicably reported negative property tax revenues.15 Table 4.2 shows the same 
descriptive statistics for the debt service per capita variable eliminating all cities in Southern California with 
populations less than 3000, which omit these outliers (Appendix B lists the cities and years dropped by 
this selection). I use this value in my per capita-based regression. 
 Variables based on proportions with revenue streams also show a high degree of variation. This is 
just because some cities have significantly stronger tax bases than others. I will use these variables in my 
regression analyses regardless of this distribution issue.  
 
Table 4.2 – Key Descriptive Statistics for Debt Per Capita (over 3000 residents) 
 
Variable n Mean Median Minimum Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Debt service expenditures 
per capita, cities over 3000 
residents 
2896 $76.38 $28.56 $0 $3658 $161 
 
 The four independent variables I selected to measure city debt burden are correlated. This 
shouldn’t come as a surprise – each marker is a widely accepted measurement of debt burden, so a city 
which shows burden in one area should also exhibit it in another. Also, revenues and expenditures in a city 
should ideally be closely related. That said, these variables are distinct measurements, and their correlations 
are evidence of their close relationship. Table 4.3 shows the correlations between them. See Chapter 3 for a 
discussion of why these particular variables were selected, despite this correlation. 
                                                          
14 Vernon, for example, has only 80 residents in its approximately five square miles and spends a roughly equivalent amount as 
El Segundo, a city of similar square mileage but much higher population. Vernon also spends roughly the same amount as 
slightly larger neighboring city, South Gate (City of El Segundo, 2017; City of South Gate, 2017; City of Vernon, 2018; US 
Census Bureau American Communities Survey 5-Year Estimates, 2017). The other city is the City of Industry. 
15 Another small city, Irwindale, in 2005. 
50 
 
 
Table 4.3 – Correlation Between Debt Burden Variables 
 
 Debt Service / Total 
Expenditures 
Debt Service / 
Capita 
Debt Service / 
Property Revenues 
Debt Service 
/  
Total 
Revenues 
Debt Service / 
Total Expenditures 
1.000    
Debt Service / Capita .264 1.000   
Debt Service / Property 
Revenues 
.500 .854 1.000  
Debt Service /  
Total Revenues 
.595 .874 .923 1.000 
 
 The three starting wage variables show moderate correlation with each other. Both administrative 
assistant and code enforcement starting wages correlate to maintenance starting wage at just over 40% (.46 
and .42, respectively) – the highest correlation in this batch. The correlate to each other at 31%. None of 
these variables correlate to salary expenditures more than .12. 
 Table 4.4 includes the descriptive statistics for the two proxy measures described in Chapter 3 – 
level of voter support for unions as measured by the percentage of ‘no’ votes against two anti-union ballot 
referendums, and relative level of progressivism as measured by three ‘yes’ vote percentages for the 
Democratic Party candidate for Governor. The variable ‘Union Proxy’ measures a linear interpolation 
between no votes for Proposition 75 in 2005 and Proposition 32 in 2012. I extrapolated this line in each 
direction before and after the two measurement years as well. Like the two referendum levels, these 
extrapolated values are symmetrically distributed with a low standard deviation and just a one percentage 
point difference between median and mean. The variable ‘Democratic Proxy’ measures approximate 
support for the Democratic Party by using two linear extrapolations. Using the percentage of ‘yes’ votes for 
Jerry Brown in his first campaign in 2010, I created two linear interpolations to the percentage of votes for 
Phil Angelides in 2006 and Jerry Brown’s re-election in 2014. I then extrapolated each line through the 
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remainder of the sample years. Though the standard deviation is higher for all of these measurements than 
for the pro-union proxy I have selected, all four have fairly symmetrical distribution. For the extrapolation, 
the difference between median and mean is only 2 percentage points.   
  
Table 4.4 – Descriptive Statistics, Control Variables 
 
Variable n Mean Median Minimum Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
% of no votes, Proposition 75 
(2005) 210 50.7% 47.7% 17.4% 100% 15.8 pp 
% of no votes, Proposition 32 
(2012) 217 53.6% 52.7% 28.1% 78.2% 10.2 pp 
Union Proxy (linear 
extrapolation) 2915 52.5% 51.5% 13.7% 94.3% 12.7 pp 
       
% of votes of Angelides (2006) 210 37.7% 34.0% 0% 83.2% 15.9 pp 
% of votes for Brown (2010) 210 49.3% 47.1% 19.9% 91.7% 15.1 pp 
% of votes for Brown (2014) 217 54.7% 52.4% 21.4% 90.3% 14.9 pp 
Democratic Proxy (dual linear 
extrapolation) 2915 52.5% 51.5% 13.7% 94.3% 12.7 pp 
 
 Table 4.5 shows the absolute number of municipalities and the number of observations 
(municipality x year) for each County and for each union. I also include the number of municipalities 
which have no union representation. The raw number of each variable is for the year 2016, and 
observations cover the entire period. The number of cities has fluctuated slightly, as a small number of new 
cities incorporated during the period of my sample data.  
For union representation, several cities in the sample negotiate with multiple unions over several 
bargaining units. For example, the City of Los Angeles negotiates with multiple unions for a variety of 
different collective bargaining units. I marked any city for each union which negotiated with the city, so 
some cities have multiple marks, explaining the higher number of observations than observations. Although 
52 
 
a small group of cities, this in all makes the total of cities with union representation by union sum to over 
100%.  
 For both counties and unions, I also include proportions of observations (city x year) and of cities 
falling in each category by in 2016. These proportions might seem like they should be identical, but they 
are not. The divergences between the proportions were caused by two factors. As mentioned above, some 
cities were incorporated between 2003 and 2016, so there are no observations for their pre-incorporation 
years. A more important factor is that, for some years, cities simply did not report data to the California 
State Controller, or reported incomplete data which rendered the information useless for this study. 
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Table 4.5 – Descriptive Statistics, Control Variables 
 
Variable n % of all  observations 
Number of 
Cities (2016) 
% of all 
Cities (2016) 
Number of 
Cities (2003) 
Los Angeles 
County 
1227 41.0% 88 40.5% 86 
Orange County 474 15.8% 34 15.7% 34 
Riverside County 361 12.1% 28 12.9% 24 
San Bernardino 
County 
334 11.2% 24 11.1% 23 
San Diego 
County 
250 8.4% 18 8.3% 18 
Ventura County 140 4.7% 10 4.6% 10 
Santa Barbara 
County 
112 3.7% 8 3.7% 8 
Imperial County 94 3.1% 7 3.2% 7 
      
Any Union 2339 78.2% 168 77.4%  
CEA 852 28.5% 61 28.1%  
SEIU 502 16.8% 36 16.6%  
AFSCME 306 10.2% 22 10.1%  
IBT 221 7.4% 16 7.4%  
OCEA 168 5.6% 12 5.5%  
Other  
AFL-CIO  
98 3.3% 7 3.2%  
Other 
Independent  
332 11.1% 24 11.1%  
No Union 653 21.8% 49 22.6%  
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Trends 
 Figure 4.1 shows data from the California State Controller’s Cities Raw Data for Fiscal Years 
2003-2016. The lines represent the mean percentage of total city expenditures going to salaries and debt 
service for the cities in my population. The x-axis tracks fiscal year, and the y-axis the percentage. A trend 
of lower proportional wage expenditures and higher proportional debt service expenditures is immediately 
clear. In addition, although debt service payments seem to have leveled off in the Post Great Recession 
period, expenditures on wages have clearly not recovered.  
 
Figure 4.1 
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 Plotting by individual cities reveals that this trend is not universal. Some cities have increased their 
debt burdens significantly, while others have only done so to a limited degree. Figure 4.2 shows debt 
service expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures on the x-axis, and salary expenditures as a 
percentage of total expenditures on the y-axis.16 Figure 4.3 shows the same scatterplot 13 years later. While 
far from compelling, the charts do show an increased trend for most cities in debt payment, and lowered 
average salary expenditures. For some outliers, the increase in debt is especially large. Seventy-five cities in 
the population saw over a 100% increase in debt. Twenty-four of these cities had increases of over 1000%. 
 
Figure 4.2 
 
                                                          
16 Cities which spent $0 on debt service have been omitted from both Figure 4.2 and 4.3 for clarity’s sake, though these cities are 
included in the regression analyses.   
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Figure 4.3 
 
  
I also plotted how these figures look in absolute expenditures. I adjusted the 2003 dollar value 
expenditures for debt service and salary, and took the natural log of each value. I then took the natural log 
of the 2016 values.17 Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the two scatterplots. There is clearly some movement 
upwards on salary, but substantially more movement to the right – an increase in debt service payment. 
Note that in general, higher raw expenditures in one category mean higher expenditures in the other – a 
trend which is immediately evident in the upward direction of the scatter. Cities with bigger budgets just 
spend more on everything.  
                                                          
17 I transform these values through a natural log because some cities spend vastly more than others given their size. Los 
Angeles, in particular, is a big spender – because it is a very big city. 
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Figure 4.4 
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Turning our attention to starting wages, Figure 4.6 shows the mean real annual starting wage (as 
measured in 2016 dollars) for the three job classifications that will be presented in regression analysis with 
the independent variables. Data for this chart comes from the California State Controller Government 
Compensation in California database. See Chapter 3 for details on how these data were processed. 
 
Figure 4.6  
 
  
 During the time period, starting wages have been worse than flat in real terms. All three job titles 
saw real losses during the period covered by the data. Both maintenance workers and administrative 
assistants saw real compensation drop by 2.8% between 2009 and 2016. Code enforcement workers saw 
real compensation drop by 2.4%, although they show a slight recovery from this downward trend since 
2014. 
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The Regressions 
 What follows is an exploration of the results of multiple regression analyses for all four dependent 
variables of my study, as compared to varying types of independent variables. All regressions in this section 
are simple ordinary-least squares single and multiple regressions.  
 
Salaries and Debt Service as percentages of total expenditures 
 Table 4.6 shows the results for various models of the primary regression for this study – the 
relationship between higher proportions of city expenditures used for debt service and the proportion used 
for salaries. The regressions on this table do not control for fixed effects. Model A is a simple single 
variable regression between the expenditures and debt, each as a percentage of total city expenditures for a 
given fiscal year. Model B adds county dummy variables as independent variables, omitting the county with 
the least number of cities, Imperial County. Model C adds the relationship between the dependent variable 
and which union represents the workforce (using dummy variables), omitting cities which do not bargain 
with a union. In each of these models, the percentage of debt service expenditures in a city budget is 
negatively associated with lower wage expenditures as a percentage of total city expenditures. Meanwhile, 
county has little influence on wage expenditures, and while being in a union does have a relationship with 
higher wage expenditures, the value is strong but small – less than 0.1 percentage points in all cases over a 
non-union city. 
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Table 4.6 – Basic Regressions, Salary as a % of Total Expenditures 
  
 
 Model A 
Single  
variable 
Model B 
Includes 
county 
Model C 
Includes  
union 
Debt expenditures as a % of all 
city expenditures -0.19 
(.000)*** 
--.21 
(.000)*** 
-.22 
(.000)*** 
Los Angeles County 
 .01 (.453)  
Orange County  -.01 (.632)  
Riverside County  -.07 (.000)***  
San Bernardino County  -.02 (.042)**  
San Diego County  .02 (.070)*  
Ventura County  .00 (.938)  
Santa Barbara County  -.02 (.144)  
CEA   .07 (.000)*** 
SEIU   .06 (.000)*** 
AFSCME   .07 (.000)*** 
IBT   .01 (.036)** 
OCEA   .08 (.000)*** 
Other AFL-CIO union   .03 (.001)*** 
Other independent union   .08 (.000)*** 
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n 2992 2992 2992 
R-Squared .009 .081 .128 
F-Statistic 27.36 32.94 54.74 
P <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
*   = p < 0.1 
**  = p < 0.05 
*** = p< 0.01 
 
 
 Table 4.7 looks at the same data, but controlling for both city and year fixed effects by treating the 
data as a panel data set. In each case the statistical significance of debt service is still present. County effects 
lose their statistical significance with fixed effects – unsurprising given that cities only fall within a single 
county. Dummies signifying the different unions do maintain significance, but again the difference in the 
salary share of budget corresponding to a one percentage point difference in the debt expenditure share is 
far larger than the differences corresponding to any of the unions. 
 
Table 4.7 – Basic Regressions, Salary as a % of Total Expenditures 
(City and Year Fixed Effects) 
 
 Model A 
Single Variable 
Model B 
Includes 
County 
Model C 
Includes  
Union 
Debt expenditures as a % of all 
city expenditures -0.21 
(.000)*** 
-.21 
(.000)*** 
-.22 
(.000)*** 
Los Angeles County 
 .01 (.811)  
Orange County  -.00 (.894)  
Riverside County  -.08 (.021)**  
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 Table 4.8 begins to incorporate my two primary proxies for pro-union political sentiment – ‘no’ 
votes on anti-union ballot measures, and ‘yes’ votes for Democratic candidates for the governor’s office. A 
positive coefficient for the pro-union proxies shows that, for each additional percentage point of voters 
San Bernardino County  -.02 (.532)  
San Diego County  .02 (.568)  
Ventura County  .00 (.976)  
Santa Barbara County  -.02 (.661)  
CEA   .08 (.000)*** 
SEIU   .07 (.000)*** 
AFSCME   .07 (.000)*** 
IBT   .02 (.398) 
OCEA   .09 (.001)*** 
Other AFL-CIO union   .04 (.245) 
Other independent union   .09 (.000)*** 
    
n (observations) 2992 2992 2992 
Number of Groups 217 217 217 
R-Squared 0.009 0.081 .128 
Chi-Square 70.37 98.23 113.57 
P <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
*   = p < 0.1 
**  = p < 0.05 
*** = p< 0.01 
63 
 
who voted to support unions, salary expenditures also rose as a percentage of total expenditures. Similarly, 
a positive coefficient for Democratic voter proxies shows an increase in salary expenditures over total 
expenditures per percentage point increase in Democratic votes. I expect each to show a positive coefficient, 
but to also improve the model for the primary independent variable – debt service.  
I first ran two single-year three-variable regressions, with the percentage of expenditures dedicated 
to debt service and the percent of voters who voted ‘no’ on Proposition 75 (Model D) and Proposition 32 
(Model E) as independent variables. The point estimates for the relationship between debt percentage and 
salary expenditures change little compared to multiyear regressions, though the statistical significance 
drops. When compared to single-year regression analysis for the year in question, however, the addition of 
the proxy variables leads to an increased debt service coefficient. For Model D, the coefficient rises from -
.15 to -.23 by adding the Prop 75 variable. For Model E the effect of Prop 32 is less extreme, but the 
coefficient again increases in magnitude, from -.17 to -.19. In each case, the statistical significance of the 
correlation between salary and debt service expenditure ratios increases with the addition of the proxy 
variable. A constituency voting pro-union increases salary expenditures in a city, but even controlling for 
that an increased debt burden is a more powerful determinant of salary expenditure levels. 
Model F regresses for the 2006 gubernatorial election, Model G for 2010, and Model H for 
2014. In all cases, the coefficient for the relationship to debt service remains very similar to the above 
models. When compared to same single year regressions, the addition of the proxy variable again leads to a 
larger estimated debt service coefficient (not shown). For all three, a Democratic-leaning residency does 
increase salary expenditures, but debt service is at least as important a determinant, though it only remains 
statistically significant in model H.  
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Table 4.8 – Single Year Regressions, Salary as a % of Total Expenditures 
 
 Model D 
Prop 75 
‘05 
Model E 
Prop 32 
‘12 
Model F 
Angelides 
‘06 
Model 
G 
Brown 
‘10 
Model H 
Brown 
‘14 
Debt expenditures as 
a % of all city 
expenditures 
-.23 
(.252) 
-.19 
(.104) 
-.19 
(.325) 
-.17 
(.311) 
-.30 
(.003)*** 
% of No Votes, 
Proposition 75 (2005) 
.10 
(.026)**     
% of No Votes, 
Proposition 32 (2012)  
.15 
(.022)**    
% of votes for 
Angelides (2006)   
.16 
(.000)***   
% of votes for Brown 
(2010)    
.18 
(.000)***  
% of votes for Brown 
(2014)     
.15 
(.001)*** 
      
n 210 217 210 210 217 
R-Squared 0.027 0.034 0.062 0.067 .081 
F-Statistic 2.84 3.73 6.78 7.29 9.44 
P .061 .026 .001 .001 .000 
*   = p < 0.1 
**  = p < 0.05 
*** = p< 0.01 
 
 Table 4.9 runs the same regressions, but for the full set of years, with the linear extrapolations for 
each proxy as the added independent variable. Again, a positive coefficient for either proxy indicates higher 
wage expenditures, and again comparing percentage points, of voters on one hand and salary expenditures 
on the other. Model I shows the union proxy measurement, and Model J the measurement for Democratic 
Party support. In each case, debt’s negative relationship remains, and statistical significance returns. Pro-
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Democratic preference has a less drastic relationship to salary expenditures than pro-union preference. In 
Table 4.10, I examine the same regression models but include fixed effects for both city and year. Both 
coefficients become very small for the proxies once I control for fixed effects. But in each case, the 
significance of and downward relationship to debt service remain strong and at the same level. Interestingly, 
the coefficient for Democratic Party support becomes negative, but not significantly different from zero, 
once I control for fixed effects, implying at first glance that support for the Democratic Party does not 
necessarily indicate more salary expenditures on workers (the confidence interval falls on both sides of 0). 
This goes against my expectations that increased support for the Democratic Party would mean increased 
salary expenditures.  It suggests that the stable differences across cities in political party preferences (which 
would be captured by fixed effects) drive the correlation with salary expenditures, whereas shift over time 
in the gubernatorial vote by party (which trended Democratic region-wide and indeed state-wide between 
2006 and 2014) have little link with shifts in the salary share. 
 
Table 4.9 – Multiyear Regressions with Proxies, Salary as a % of Total Expenditures 
 
 Model I 
Proxy for Union Support 
Model J 
Proxy for Democratic Party 
Support 
Debt expenditures as a % of all 
city expenditures -.17 
(.000)*** 
-.17 
(.000)*** 
Union Proxy .14 
(.000)***  
Democratic Proxy  .07 (.000)*** 
   
n 2915 2865 
R-Squared 0.038 0.022 
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F-Statistic 57.08 32.76 
P .037 .000 
*   = p < 0.1 
**  = p < 0.05 
*** = p< 0.01 
 
Table 4.10  – Multiyear Regressions with Proxies, Salary as a % of Total Expenditures 
(City and Year Fixed Effects) 
 
 Model I 
Proxy for Union Support 
Model J 
Proxy for Democratic Party 
Support 
Debt expenditures as a % of all 
city expenditures -.22 
(.000)*** 
-.20 
(.000)*** 
Union Proxy .03 
(.159)  
Democratic Proxy  -.03 (.002)*** 
   
N (observations) 2915 2865 
Number of Groups 209 206 
R-Squared 0.015 .000 
Chi-Square 71.18 74.29 
P .000 .000 
*   = p < 0.1 
**  = p < 0.05 
*** = p< 0.01 
 
 Recall that these regressions are using extrapolated values for each proxy, which I theorized would 
not disrupt my model globally since the extrapolations were for relatively brief periods of time (no more 
than 4 years in any single case). I also ran regressions using only interpolated lines between the actual 
measurements (i.e. the two anti-union initiatives, in the case of the union proxy, and the two lines 
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extending from the central gubernatorial election in the case of the Democratic proxy); for these regressions 
I controlled for fixed effects, so we are comparing to Table 4.10. For the Democratic proxy, the difference 
in the coefficient for my primary variable of study (debt service) between the interpolation and the 
extrapolation is very small (-.19 for the interpolation versus -.20 for the extrapolation). The coefficient on 
the Democratic proxy becomes positive, registering at .03 (versus -.03), however it loses its statistical 
significance. In either case, the coefficient is small and the R-squared value is very low. It seems safe to 
conclude that this variable has little significance for my primary variables of interest. 
 The difference is more important in the union proxy variable. When interpolating, the coefficient 
on my primary variable of study becomes -.15 (versus -.22 for the extrapolation). The value of the union 
proxy variable itself changes substantially as well, increasing from .03 from the extrapolation to .16 for the 
interpolation, and with a significantly higher statistical significance. The R-squared value increases 
substantially as well, to .07. I’m not sure what’s happening here. The results may imply that community 
union support has a stronger positive relationship to increased salary expenditures than the extrapolation 
allows. On the other hand, there are far fewer observations (n=1703), which could create different 
distortions to the model’s outcome. While this represents an intriguing potential area for future research, 
and indicates that my models may not really be capturing the total effect of voters attitudes towards unions 
as expressed at the polls, once I add in other variable the differences flatten out, and ultimately the change 
to my main coefficient of interest is small. My future regression models will continue to use the 
extrapolation, with the caveat that there are slight differences when I use the interpolation for this proxy. 
 Table 4.11 shows multivariate regression models adding in county and union controls (Model K), 
and adding in population as an independent variable as well (Model L). In each case, the relationship 
between increased debt service expenditures and decreased salary expenditures remain. Table 4.12 shows 
the same models, but controlling for fixed effects. In each model, adding fixed effects drops the magnitude 
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of the debt service coefficient slightly, but the association remains highly statistically significant.18 
Interestingly, controlling for fixed effects does not change the coefficient for population, but lowers the 
statistical significance by a great deal. This is perhaps because population itself is something close to a fixed 
effect – something unique to the city in question – since it does not vary much over time in most cities in 
Southern California.19 
 
Table 4.11 – Multivariate Regressions, Salary as a % of Total Expenditures 
 
 Model K 
All variables 
Model L 
All variables + 
Population 
Debt expenditures as a % of 
all city expenditures -.22 
(.000)*** 
-.23 
(.000)*** 
Union Proxy .20 
(.000)*** 
.20 
(.000)*** 
Democratic Proxy -.08 
(.000)*** 
-.08 
(.000)*** 
Population (per million 
residents)  
.01 
(.222) 
Union variables YES YES 
County variables YES YES 
   
n 2854 2850 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.18076 0.18176 
F-Statistic 36.73 34.78 
                                                          
18 For these and the following tables, I simply list a YES or NO to indicate that I included all County and individual union control 
variables. The estimated county and union coefficients are similar to those in Tables 4.5-4.6.  County variables are particularly 
unhelpful since they are basically static categories of cities. Tracking county improves the R-Squared value and does not change 
the coefficient of my primary variable of interest, but few of the county coefficients have statistical significance. Union variables 
also improve the R-Squared of the model, and many do have statistical significance. Suffice to say having a union also generally 
means a higher salary expenditure, though not to the degree of even a single percentage point of debt service.  
19 I also ran regression models where I used robust clustering for standard errors. The n value drops slightly, but the relationship 
is still highly statistically significant at p of .000, and there is basically no change to the coefficients. 
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P .000 .000 
*   = p < 0.1 
**  = p < 0.05 
*** = p< 0.01 
 
 
 
Table 4.12 – Multivariate Regressions, Salary as a % of Total Expenditures 
(City and Year Fixed Effects) 
 
 Model K 
All variables 
Model L 
All variables + 
Population 
Debt expenditures as a % of all 
city expenditures -.20 
(.000)*** 
-.20 
(.000)*** 
Union Proxy .10 
(.000)*** 
.10 
(.000)*** 
Democratic Proxy -.06 
(.000)*** 
-.06 
(.000)*** 
Population (per million 
residents) 
 
 .01 (.700) 
Union variables YES YES 
County variables YES YES 
   
n (observations) 2854 2850 
Number of sets 205 205 
R-Squared .175 .175 
Chi-Square 144.09 143.64 
P .000 .000 
*   = p < 0.1 
**  = p < 0.05 
*** = p< 0.01 
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 Throughout all of these models, the coefficient relating debt service as a percent of total 
expenditure to salaries as a percent of total expenditures remains very close to the -.2 mark. For every 5-
percentage point increase in debt service expenditures, salary expenditures can be expected to drop by about 
one percentage point. More importantly, in all of these models, one percentage point increase in debt 
service expenditures is associated with a larger difference in salary expenditures than whether or not 
workers are represented by a union, which county they work in, a two percentage points increase in pro-
union preference of residents as measured at the ballot box, or a theoretical 20 million population increase. 
 
Regressions with other debt markers 
 Municipal debt burdens can be measured through several benchmarks, not just using debt as a 
percentage of total expenditures. New models using single and multivariate regressions of salary 
expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures against three other common debt markers, namely debt 
per capita, debt per property tax revenue, and debt per total revenue, verify the negative relationship of debt 
service and public sector wage expenditures. 
 Table 4.13 shows regression model results for these other debt markers (including fixed effects for 
city and year). Model N is a single variate regression of salary expenditures against debt service per capita 
(as expressed in 2016 real dollars). Recall from Chapter 3 that this excludes all cities with less than 3000 
residents to eliminate outliers.20 Model N measures salary expenditures against the ratio of debt service to 
property tax revenues, and Model O measures debt service to all revenues. Models P, Q, and R add in some 
other independent control variables from above against the same three primary independent variables. In all 
cases, the negative associatioin is present. This shows that the negative coefficient from my primary 
                                                          
20 Leaving the outliers in still shows a negative coefficient, but the value is only -.06 in single variable analysis. In multivariable 
analysis, this rises to -40.15 – still lower than the value without the outliers but significantly higher. 
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independent and dependent variables is not just a fluke of percentage comparison. These regressions show 
similar results when controlling for city and year fixed effects. 
 
Table 4.13 – Single and Multivariate Regressions, Salary as a % of Total Expenditures 
(City and Year Fixed Effects) 
 
 Model 
M 
Debt 
Serv. 
per 
capita 
Model N 
Debt 
Serv./ 
Prop. Rev. 
Model O 
Debt 
Serv./ 
All Rev. 
Model P 
Debt 
Serv. 
per 
capita  
Model Q 
Debt 
Serv./ 
Prop. Rev. 
Model R 
Debt 
Serv./ 
All Rev. 
Debt service 
expenditures (real 
2016$) per million 
residents) 
-28.2 
(.001)***   
-26.0 
(.003)***   
Debt service over 
property tax 
revenues 
 -.002 (.000)***   
-.005 
(.000)***  
Debt service over 
all revenues   
-.015 
(.000)***   
-.06 
(.000)*** 
Union Proxy    .11 (.000)*** 
.12 
(.000)*** 
.12 
(.000)*** 
Democratic Proxy    -.07 (.000)*** 
-.07 
(.000)*** 
-.06 
(.000)*** 
Union variables NO NO NO YES YES YES 
       
n 2896 2990 2992 2799 2853 2854 
R-Squared 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.107 0.116 0.127 
Chi-Square 10.09 33.18 32.70 73.90 123.56 161.86 
P .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
*   = p < 0.1 
**  = p < 0.05 
*** = p< 0.01 
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 Due to the correlations between these variables, it should not be too surprising that the negative 
relationship remains. No matter which measurement of debt is used, the results are the same – a higher 
debt burden is negatively associated with the percent of money a city expends on salaries. 
 
Starting wage regressions 
 Using the same independent variables, I now turn to a set of new dependent variables – the starting 
annual wages for three job classifications. Although results are nowhere near as compelling as for absolute 
salary expenditures, there is some evidence that increased debt expenditures is associated with lower starting 
wages. Furthermore, lower starting annual wages have a higher the negative coefficient associated with debt, 
and the correlation is more statistically significant, meaning that low-wage workers may be shouldering the 
brunt of cities’ increased debt burdens. All regressions in this section were performed using city and year 
fixed effects, since starting salaries can vary widely between otherwise seemingly similar cities. 
 Table 4.14 shows three regression models for the annual starting wage for entry-level positions (all 
three models control for city and year fixed effects, and again, non-union workforce and Imperial County 
are the baselines). Model S measures maintenance workers, Model T measures administrative assistants, 
and Model U measures code enforcement officers. Model S exhibits a negative relationship on maintenance 
wages just outside of statistical significance. For every one percentage point increase in debt service 
expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures, maintenance worker starting wages drop by over $2700 
per year. Administrative assistants exhibit a similar pattern in Model T, again just outside the realm of 
statistical significance and to the tune of a $2500 per year pay cut for each additional percentage point of 
debt service expenditures. Code enforcement workers exhibit a negative point estimate, but the distribution 
is such that it is harder to make a broader statement about anything beyond that. In both models S and T, 
the relationship between debt expenditures and starting salary is the amongst the highest in statistical 
significance of all independent variables, debt is more likely to be related to the dependent variable than all 
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but a few of the specific union dummies signifying which union represents the workers and negotiates their 
salaries (not shown). Though none of the relationships are statistically significant, Models S and T lie just 
outside of statistical significance.  
 The union proxy variable has a larger coefficient than the debt variable in the administrative 
assistant regression model. The Democratic Party proxy has a significant negative relationship in this 
model. These values may come as a surprise. However, there is some interplay between the two variables – 
the Democratic and union proxies have a high degree of correlation. The model is likely using these 
variables to offset each other. When run as solo variables in this multivariate regression, the coefficient is 
negative (for either) but significantly smaller.21  
 
Table 4.14 – Multivariate Regressions, Diverse Starting Wages 
(City and Year Fixed Effects) 
 
 Model S 
Maintenance 
Model T 
Administrative 
Assistant 
Model U 
Code 
Enforcement 
Debt expenditures as a % of  
all city expenditures -2740 
(.104) 
-2543 
(.123) 
-2015 
(.472) 
Union Proxy 398 
(.895) 
6068 
(.084)* 
2927 
(.535) 
Democratic Proxy -12113 
(.000)*** 
-11675 
(.000)*** 
-11866 
(.000)*** 
Union variables YES YES YES 
County variables YES YES YES 
    
n (observations) 1296 1196 1077 
                                                          
21 Often, variables which measure income are transformed before regression analysis, typically through an algorithm. This is 
normally done to flatten any outliers. As shown in the Descriptive Statistics section above, there are few outliers in these job 
classifications – most salaries are close together, and all three show nice bells when examined in a histogram. I opted to leave 
the values untransformed so the coefficient is easier to interpret. That said, I did run regression models where I transformed all 
three wages through a natural log algorithm. There was little difference in the outcome. 
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Number of sets 185 180 162 
R-Squared 0.169 0.163 0.151 
Chi-Square 124.14 80.14 48.17 
P .000 .000 .000 
*   = p < 0.1 
**  = p < 0.05 
*** = p< 0.01 
 
Interviews 
 To supplement these quantitative findings, I also conducted four open-ended interviews with 
union representatives who routinely actively engaged in collective bargaining with cities across Southern 
California. Three interviews were one-one-one, while the fourth was a group-style interview with multiple 
union representatives who all worked for a single organization. 
 While all union representatives sense additional pressures at the bargaining table, these interviews 
reveal that municipal debt is simply not on the radar of unions. Union representatives see other factors as 
being far more significant to member compensation than debt, including political climate, the general 
economic cycle, and the pressures caused by increasingly expensive benefits.  
 Concerning borrowing, one member of the group of representatives I spoke with summed up the 
group’s feeling succinctly – “The municipal bond market is what it is.” Representatives in this group felt 
strongly that the issue of debt only arose if a city wound up in bankruptcy, and that borrowing was not a 
factor in employee wages since no city in their right mind would take on money to fund on-going labor 
costs dollar for dollar. In other words, since the debt did not go to wages, it was irrelevant.  
 In a different interview, another representative who works in Orange County said the issue of bond 
debt and bond ratings, which was still almost a mania at the County even three decades after the County’s 
famous bankruptcy (Jorion, 1995), no longer weighed heavily on Orange County cities. From this 
representative’s perspective, the bond market simply did not come up at the city level, and that the cities 
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the union dealt with were only incidentally concerned with their bond ratings. The difference between city 
and county approaches to governance and fiscal responsibility in Orange County is evidently an interesting 
area for possible future research, since most cities were seriously affected by knock-on effects of the 
county’s bankruptcy due to common benefits pools and intergovernmental transfers. 
 Shockingly, at least one organization declines to even independently investigate city finances before 
entering into bargaining. The union representatives would instead sit with their bargaining committee and 
the city manager and hear a presentation about the city’s financial situation. The representative would then 
caucus with members to see if the presentation rang true or not. This cavalier attitude to an employer’s 
fiscal situation reveals a general lack of willingness to even ask questions about what is under the hood of a 
city budget. I note that other interview subjects described doing occasional independent audits of cities, 
often at great expense, to verify financial information which came from the city before entering into 
bargaining. At least one representative described this as a tactic to placate members as much as to uncover 
city financial information. 
 Only one interview subject believed strongly that the issue of bonded debt and the financial 
constraints which can come with it is a major issue for public sector workers. The union this representative 
works for is one of the few to directly raise the issue and terms of borrowing in negotiations with a city, 
the City of Los Angeles during contract negotiations at the end of the Great Recession. According to this 
representative, the union had more or less abandoned talking about debt once the contract was settled, and 
had essentially used the discussion of debt as a bargaining tactic with the city.  
 Another subject also acknowledged the importance of debt burden, but focused instead on the 
terms of borrowing – making sure cities did not pay too much in fees, or invested borrowed money 
properly. This individual pointed to the same efforts at Los Angeles and the resulting commission to 
investigate how the city borrows money as a key victory, and felt the project was on-going.   
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However, even these relative believers were quick to point out that the issue of bonded debt was 
not always important at all times, with the degree of import depending heavily on the employer and the 
economic cycle. When the former union bargained with San Diego County, for example, the issue of debt 
did not come up, with the union opting instead to focus on the county’s cash reserves. 
I asked both of these representatives what a smaller city could do to improve their position vis-à-
vis financial institutions when they borrow. One representative acknowledged that smaller cities were 
essentially unable to contest such terms on their own, and would only even be able to raise the question of 
terms of borrowing in the context of a broader coalition with a primate city like Los Angeles at the center. 
The other expressed a belief that small cities do not borrow as often, and thus unfavorable loan terms 
matter less in the long run in smaller jurisdictions.  
 Despite mostly not making the connection between wages and competing expenditures like debt 
service, union representatives in the group expressed dismay about the downward pressure members felt on 
wages. One member of the group put it clearly: “Most (members) see the economy doing so much better, 
but haven’t seen that reflected in their wages.” Yet just a few minutes later, members of this same group 
were the ones to agree that most cities they bargained with had plenty of money to go around. One 
member stated: “It’s not a question of money, it’s a question of values.” A second rejoined: “Money is in 
the eye of the beholder. It gets down to where they want to spend that money.”  
 This attitude is typical of private sector unionism, which tends to assume that an employer will 
always have enough money to fund wages or benefits as long as there is any kind of profit margin. In the 
public sector, however, there are serious constraints to total revenues, which in turn affect total 
expenditures. This is especially true in post-Proposition 13 California. As for expenditures, once a city 
commits to paying interest on a debt, for example, defaulting on that debt could have major consequences 
that are not immediately analogous to a private sector actor. When negotiating a collective bargaining 
agreement, a city already knows what their debt service payments will likely be throughout the life of the 
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new contract – given rigid repayment schedules, they probably know what they will look like for the next 
30 years. The, while it may be a ‘question of values’ for wages and benefits, when it comes to debt service 
expenditures are a fairly rigid commitment.  
 All representatives I spoke with readily acknowledged the complications that come with the 
cyclical nature of bargaining – and with juggling multiple contracts. One representative spoke of running 
‘from fire to fire,’ with union leadership shifting their attention to Riverside County literally days after the 
City of Los Angeles contract was ratified. Another representative said that in any given year approximately 
60 contracts would come up for bargaining union-wide – more than one new contract reopening every 
week on average. At a pace like that, it would be very difficult to get into detailed analysis of financial 
information for each case. During the Great Recession, when cities did not know how long the crisis would 
last, some city managers were pushing two year agreements (or even less), which only complicated this 
problem for the organization. The representative claimed the organization was finally catching up with the 
demands of negotiation post-Recession, but that it had taken years. With a new recession presumably 
looming most workers were pushing hard for longer agreements to lock in post-Recession gains – or more 
likely, a lack of post-Recession losses.  
 Representatives were mixed on their perceptions of geography and its effect on bargaining. One 
representative felt that cities in San Diego County and the Inland Empire in particular posed tough nuts to 
crack for workers because of a lack of developed community organizations. Another representative felt that 
the Orange County generally had a bad – and no longer deserved – reputation for conservativism, but then 
went on to recount stories of a city (Costa Mesa) trying to outsource literally every job as an opening 
gambit for bargaining. The union had an ugly fight there, and the representative attributed the relative 
peace and calm of post-Recession Orange County to the union’s efforts and ultimate victory over the 
outsourcing. To put it bluntly, other cities did not want to become the next Costa Mesa. 
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 Members of the panel, which represented workers both in and out of the Southern California 
region, felt county did not matter much but city to city, things could vary widely, particularly in cities with 
large hoarded cash reserves. The flip side of this were spendthrift cities which gave away salaries or benefits 
at levels even the representatives feared might be unsustainable. If correct, this common idea that a lot 
simply depends on local politicians, local politics, and a healthy dose of je ne sais quoi, may explain the low 
R-squared values of the above regression models. While city fixed effects should control for many local 
quirks, what goes into wages also depends a lot on the history of collective bargaining for most workers. 
Further research should try to expand on categories which may go into debt burden and salary 
expenditures, including community fiscal capacity and income levels. In my models, fixed effects have to 
control for these factors, which may be lowering my R-squared values. A lot goes into determining how 
much cities spend on employees, and my models show that debt is probably a low but important part of 
the puzzle.  
 It is worth pointing out that these interviews also belie a common conception that unions celebrate 
city debt because it means more spending on more projects which ultimately means more members. None 
of the union representatives I spoke with framed city debt in this light. Rather, they reported for the most 
part thinking about municipal bonds about as much as the average person – something vaguely familiar, 
but out of their control and ultimately meaningless for their membership. This attitude is likely different 
for building trades unions, whose members work to build debt financed projects.  
 
Conclusion 
 Increased debt service payments do correlate to lower salary expenditures. This pattern holds true 
when I measure debt in several different ways. In addition, for low-wage workers at least, more debt may 
lead to lower starting wages. Yet interviews with union negotiators indicate that unions are not aware of 
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this potential downward pressure on wages. For them, debt is something beyond their control, which 
ultimately has little effect on their ability to deliver benefits for their members at the bargaining table. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I briefly discuss the findings from Chapter 4 – namely a clear correlation between 
higher debt service payments (when controlled by various ways) and lower salary expenditures in cities, and 
a possible negative relationship with starting wages for low-wage workers. Municipal budgets are very 
complex, and there is no way to show a clear line of causality here. But the regression models show that 
more debt service generally means less spent on salaries as a whole, and might mean lower starting wages 
for already low-wage workers. Because of the obvious mechanism – a dollar spent on one thing cannot be 
spent on another – the implication is clear – debt service may be hurting city workers. 
 
Salary Expenditures 
 The regression models in the above section reveal a clear relationship between increased debt 
service burdens and decreased salary expenditures, and strongly imply there is some kind of downward 
relationship to worker entry-level wages for some low-wage jobs because of the same debt service burdens.  
 A clear pattern of correlation between the percent of a city’s budget dedicated to salary 
expenditures and the debt service burden is evident in all of the models of this study, regardless of how the 
latter variable is measured. For every 5-percentage point increase in debt service expenditures, a city will 
spend about one percentage point less on wages.  
 Obviously. Debt service and salary expenditures are two parts of a whole, which is always 100% 
regardless of the size of its components. You would expect at least this relationship, if not more. But I 
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argue that cutting from salaries to pay for debt service is not equivalent to cutting in other areas of the city 
budget given the key role of cities in a regional economy as an employer. If the trend of increasing 
borrowing is going to continue, in the long-run this could mean less dollars to working people and more to 
lenders.  
 What is more, while some debt may leave salary expenditures flat in absolute terms, debt service is 
very inflexible, leaving cities with few options during a downturn to limit annual payments. Cuts have to 
come from somewhere. Salary expenditures, for a variety of reasons, are more flexible, generally through 
not filling open positions (see Chapter 2 for a discussion). This is the opposite from the traditional remedy 
for recession – expanding public employment. 
 At any rate, the negative correlation holds when salary expenditures are measures against debt 
service per capita or per dollar of revenue, whether property tax revenues or all revenues. The percentage 
effect is not as strong in these calculations since they are not direct percentages of total expenditures, 
although there is of course some correlation between the debt variables. The negative coefficient in all cases 
bolsters my finding that there is a correlation between the two variables beyond the simple mechanism of 
percentage play. The negative relationship to the treatment endures across years, across cities, across sub-
regional geographies, across relative community support for unions or for the nominally worker-friendly 
Democratic Party, and even across all unions which represent workers.  
 Perhaps this seems like an insignificant amount. After all, increasing debt service by 5 whole 
percentage points in a single year is unlikely to happen in any city, even one facing a grave crisis of 
revenues. Fair enough, but the mean city in Southern California did increase its debt service payments as a 
percentage of total expenditures by one percentage point during the observation period. Many increased 
their obligations by substantially more. With the caveat that debt burden may not the most important 
thing driving city finances, things could easily get out of hand for workers in a city that borrows a lot of 
money – even without a dramatic near-default like New York in the 1970s.  
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 Yet unions seem to have largely missed this effect. City budgeting is complex, and the sum may 
not exactly equal the parts of the whole in many ways. Unravelling the history of how salaries are set and 
why is immensely complicated, and no model used in this study fully explains how things got to where they 
are in any given year or city. While a few unions have begun examining the effects of debt burden on their 
wages, benefits, and communities, interviews from this study indicate that in general union representatives 
view the bond market like most of us do – an incredibly boring sideshow, unrelated to employee wages.  
 This study questions the theory that capital projects – and their associated debt – happen in a silo 
away from routine city spending. In Southern California, only SEIU and AFSCME have (jointly) raised 
the issue of the relationship between their employer and the banks which offer up municipal loans, and 
then only at the City of Los Angeles, arguably a very special case due to its massive size and several-times-a-
year patterns of borrowing money. Data from interviews imply this may have been largely a bargaining 
tactic, not a long-term goal at renegotiation of terms of debt, though the situation is still unfurling. 
 It is clear that debt service is not the only factor that influences wages, especially given the small R-
squared statistics for the models. Revenues will always be a major source of concern, particularly in times 
of recession or downturn. Some unions are aggressively pursuing other ways to improve municipal finance 
outlooks in other ways. The Teamsters in particular have an effort in San Bernardino County aimed at 
increasing sales tax revenues for both cities and the county itself to seek out better deals at the bargaining 
table. Increasing city revenues also decreases the proportion of a city’s expenditures which go toward debt 
service, assuming a city does not borrow any more money – debt service payments are generally more or 
less flat between issues, though not invariably. In contrast, raising revenues will not be available for either 
employees or residents if a city just turns around and hands the new revenue stream over to bondholders 
through new debt issues.  
 Wages are doubtless not the only area to suffer from downward pressures of debt, though they are 
the primary area of interest for this study. Emerging research looking at the relationship between debt 
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service and programmatic expenses may complement the picture painted by this study’s models by painting 
a picture of debt’s effects on communities who borrow and the services their governments provide. 
 Perhaps the lack of salience of this issue is simply due to a broader period of relative economic 
prosperity generally. At the time of the Great Recession, many were willing to question anew the 
relationship between local government and banks. For now, there seems to be enough money to go around. 
But if past economic downturns have been any indication, at a time of crisis debt service will always come 
first in expenditures to avoid default and its aftermath. Other considerations, like wages of employees or 
community programs, will play second fiddle. 
  
Starting Wages 
 So why is the relationship less clear when we look at actual starting wages? In the context of a 
union, starting wages in particular may be set years in advance, as most collective bargaining agreements last 
multiple years. It makes sense that raw expenditures show an easier to track relationship to annual debt 
service payments, since city managers adjust annual salary and benefit expenditures in countless ways – 
principally by not filling positions – to meet budgetary constraints or opportunities. Starting wages are 
nowhere near as flexible. For one thing, they can only change every time a contract re-opens, which is 
generally not each year. When that does happen, it would be difficult for a union representative to 
convince their membership to ratify a collective bargaining agreement which lowered starting wages in 
nominal dollars – an intuitive idea dating back to at least Keynes (1935). This sets a relatively concrete 
floor for any nominal starting wage, since practically it can only fluctuate up and then only in (typically) 
two-to-three-year increments.  
 The end result is what we see – stagnant or slowly falling real wages which loosely mirror the 
downward pressure of debt service.  
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 Low starting wages of course are not paid to anyone, except a brand-new worker. The odds of a 
specific city hiring a new worker in any specific year are quite low, leaving out large outliers like the City of 
Los Angeles. Nonetheless, if starting wages decrease over time, in the long-term city employees will be 
making substantially less money. Further research comparing average actual payments to individual 
workers, particular low-wage workers, might also be more instructive than the wage models included in this 
study, though the California State Controller’s Government Compensation in California dataset does not 
include names or other individual identifiers. 
 Despite the above considerations, the models in this study do suggest to a negative relationship to 
wages for low-wage workers like maintenance workers and administrative assistants. Although these job 
classifications are at least as likely as management-style or high-skill workers to be represented by unions, 
their wages seem to more clearly exhibit some kind of downward relationship to debt service payments 
than the profession of code enforcement. If true, low-wage workers may be shouldering a disproportionate 
burden of the effects of debt service of our region’s cities in the long-term. This information is thus 
especially important for unions which represent blue-collar bargaining units at Southern California cities.  
 Maintenance worker starting wages showed the strongest negative association to debt service in 
absolute dollars, and were already the lowest starting wage of any of the three classifications explored by 
this study. Table 5.1 shows the mean wages, separated by county, for 2016 as revealed by the same State 
Comptroller data set used to power the above models, and compares those values to HUD guidelines for 
low-income status for a family of two (a conservative assumption, since many maintenance workers surely 
have larger families) for the primary metropolitan statistical area of the county. Most of these starting 
salaries are at or even below the low-income line. Every percentage point increase in debt service is reflected 
as a $2700 decrease in annual salary – about 7% of the mean starting wage for maintenance workers in 
Southern California (roughly $38,000 per year). In three of the eight counties of this study, assuming the 
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model is correct, a single additional percentage point of debt service payments would correspond to a 
predicted starting maintenance wage below the HUD’s ‘very low’ income limit for a family of two.  
 
Table 5.1 – HUD Poverty Levels & City Starting Maintenance Wage by County 
 
County 
Mean Starting 
Annual 
Maintenance 
Wage, 2016 
HUD very low-
income limit, 2 
person family, 
2016 
Difference 
between starting 
wage and very 
low-income limit 
Debt service percent 
point change to drop 
wages into low 
income/very low income 
Los 
Angeles $39,304 $34,750 $4554 1.66 pp 
Orange $39,883 $39,000 $883 0.32 pp 
Riverside $38,916 $25,600 $13,316 4.86 pp 
San 
Bernardino $35,224 $25,600 $9624 3.51pp 
San Diego $36,206 $34,000 $2206 0.81pp 
Santa 
Barbara $36,391 $33,700 $2691 0.98pp 
Ventura $36,585 $37,400 -$815 Already below limit. 
No available HUD data for Imperial County 
 
 If the model is capturing a causal relationship, a small change in the amount of a city budget 
dedicated to debt service could plunge workers into dire straits in the long-term. This can happen even if 
the employer does not borrow more. If the denominator shrinks through lower revenues due to an 
economic downturn, the ratio will still rise because debt service always gets paid.   
  It is important to recall these are not wages necessarily paid to any specific worker. Rather these 
are wages due to new workers – a marginal addition to the city’s labor force in any of these job categories. 
But assuming people are being hired at or near these wages, the future has already been mortgaged.  
 Union negotiators recognized this trend in interviews, though they did not make a connection to 
debt. Negotiators tended to focus on areas like benefits rather than on wages – two-tier pensions in 
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particular came up in one interview. Although public sector workers make less than their private sector 
counterparts, benefit plans help bridge the gap and make up for the difference in wages (Lewin et al., 
2012). The interplay between salaries and benefits at the bargaining table is complex. Worker preference 
changes over the lifespan of a career, with younger workers tending to want higher wages and older workers 
preferring secure pensions. While beyond the scope of this study, it would be interesting to know how debt 
burden and benefit obligations interact, but the relationship may be harder to ascertain. Unlike salaries, 
benefit expenditure is difficult to measure. When it comes to the defined benefit pension plan, the system 
itself is frequently intertwined with debt. Pension obligation bonds represent a very risky and speculative 
arbitrage gambit. Cities borrow money and use it to prefund pension obligations with the hope that the 
money invested in the pension fund outperforms the interest payments on the debt. This risk rarely pays 
off, but despite advice to the contrary cities keep on trying (Munnell et al., 2014). The interplay between 
all of these forces makes an evaluation of the relationship between debt and employee benefits difficult to 
ascertain.  
 The stagnancy of real starting wages discussed in Chapter 4 should be a major concern, not just to 
unions who represent workers, but to anyone concerned about low-wage worker compensation in the 
regional economy. Given government’s outsize role as an employer, decreased public sector wages can have 
a downward effect on a variety of regional wage outcomes.  
 The issue is particularly salient for those communities which rely heavily on public sector 
employment for quality jobs. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Black community, and especially the Black 
community in Los Angeles County, may see drastic long-term effects if public sector compensation 
continues to drop. Given low public sector turnover, the effects of starting wage stagnancy and debt 
pressure may not be felt for some time, instead acting as a pernicious gradual lowering of community 
income as positions remain unfilled and new jobs pay lower starting wages over time.  
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Limitations 
 None of these models seem to predict to a great degree any of my dependent variables. Additional 
data might in principle strengthen these models and further explain the relationship between debt service, 
wage expenditures, and starting wages—but added variables of greatest interest are difficult to measure at 
best. 
 Union bargaining strength is the key missing element to my models. The relative strength of a 
bargaining unit likely has more effect on collective bargaining outcomes than anything besides the 
constraints of the budget itself. But it is difficult to measure how powerful any given union is. One variable 
might be membership levels in the union. No one can be forced to join a union – membership is entirely 
voluntary. Under California law, non-members contributed a lower ‘fair-share’ contribution to avoid issues 
of free riding until the recent Janus v. AFSCME Supreme Court decision, which ruled that public sector 
fair-share fees were an unlawful infringement on freedom of speech. Most public sector unions have thus 
been engaged in membership recruitment drives over the past five years in anticipation of Janus, which was 
the culmination of a series of legal challenges to the concept of fair-share fees.22 Interviews suggest that 
public sector union membership thus has experienced rapid increases in recent years (though the number of 
covered workers has not). While this author would never question the utility of recruiting members into 
the union, the numbers may not accurately reflect participation or engagement by represented members 
either before or after the drives – the ultimate measure of union power. Another problem with this variable 
is that the information is not necessarily public, and cities may not surrender it even under public records 
request. 
 This study instead looked at which actual union represented the workers as a proxy for union 
strength. I found that, while being in a union put workers ahead of the non-union baseline for starting 
                                                          
22 The first such case, Harris v. Quinn, was decided in 2014.  
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wages and for total salary expenditures, in general it made little difference which union they join. Most of 
the estimated union associations were statistically significant and similar in magnitude.  Only one union, 
the Teamsters (IBT), was not associated with upward wages to a statistically significant degree. Most IBT 
public sector bargaining units are located in very conservative areas of Southern California, such as 
Antelope Valley of Los Angeles County or the Inland Empire. This finding may reflect the conservativism 
of local policy makers as much as anything the union did or did not do. Government workers represented 
by unions in the ‘Other AFL-CIO’ category also showed a smaller wage boost than others. The City of 
Long Beach includes bargaining units represented by the Machinists (IAM) union, which is not a primarily 
public sector organization. Long Beach has very low starting wages, an outlier in the wage spread for all 
three job classifications, though without a closer look at the area it is difficult to pin this on the IAM. 
 Besides these two exceptions, being represented by a union does seem to generally increase 
expenditures on wages and increase starting wage in all of the cities in this sample – a finding which 
confirms a common point of pride in the labor movement and a common point of complaint for those 
who hate it. This proxy did not really measure the degree of union power, however, leaving a major 
independent variable out of our model.  
 Another proxy used in this study was to examine the level of community support for unions by 
examining voter preference in anti-union ballot measures. There were only two samples taken throughout 
the entire period of study, so this measurement is imperfect, and measuring union support linearly between 
these two points is problematic. Extrapolating beyond each point is even more so. Working with only two 
years data at opposing ends of the Great Recession also raises issues of comparability. Though median 
voter hypothesis would seem to indicate that the number of votes for or against anti-union ballot initiatives 
might reflect the preferences of a community and thus alter the behavior of city administrators at the 
bargaining table, it is equally arguable that local politicians generally do not even consider local collective 
bargaining as a controversy – at least not in the union stronghold of Southern California.  
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 The fact is that collective bargaining in the public sector is so pervasive in Southern California that 
it is not generally a major campaign issue. This is unlike other parts of the country where local collective 
bargaining is still a salient issue at election time. Most public sector unions in California organized nearly 
50 years ago, during the major wave of public sector organizing in the 1970s. Although this study did not 
seek out evidence of it, experience as a resident of Southern California reveals few examples of public sector 
officials running on a ‘get-tough-on-labor’ platform in recent years. An interview with the Orange County 
union representative indicated that even in a very conservative community there, politicians found taking a 
tough anti-union stance quickly became a political liability for them. The community where politicians 
tried to outsource all work had voted for the anti-union ballot measures, by 57% in 2012 and by a 
whopping 74% in 2005. But that community turned against the city when politicians attempted to lay off 
all city staff, themselves union members. 
 The study also used support for Democratic candidates as a proxy. In theory, the Democratic Party 
is more closely allied with the labor movement. Democratic candidates take more money from unions, and 
at the local level the labor movement often encourages members to run for office. Perhaps they would be 
more likely to be soft on labor at the bargaining table and offer higher compensation, or make cuts in areas 
besides salary expenditures when the going gets tough, fiscally speaking. The data painted a very different 
picture, showing a small negative relationship between wages as support levels increased for the Democratic 
Party. I believe this is a reflection of the simultaneous increase in support for the Democratic Party 
generally over the study period at all levels of government, and the decrease in real wages and salary 
expenditures over the same period due to distinct causes – a spurious correlation. The three data points I 
used may not be the best reflections of support for the Democratic Party at a local level. City politicians 
are not openly party members in name, but in most cities in the study they are Democratic Party members 
in practice. The variable is also a weak predictor, since it is an extrapolation, and has a high degree of 
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correlation with the union proxy variable (though the latter is more stable). This correlation may have also 
created distortions.  
 Intermediate levels of elected officials, like state representatives, senators, or US House of 
Representative members, bleed across community lines. In smaller cities, two neighboring communities may 
have vastly different political preferences but share a district. One might carry the other through an 
accident of districting. In the case of larger cities, which may include dozens of such elected officials, 
measuring support levels by party for the city as a whole is probably meaningless anyways due to the 
heterogeneity of political preference. In the end, I selected a level that was the same statewide since I was 
seeking relative support, but the extrapolation likely created correlative issues that render the variable 
meaningless. The other possibility, of course, is that this may indicate labor’s relationship with Democratic 
candidates has not always paid off.  
 Putting that question aside, both proxies used in this study thus come up short for explaining 
collective bargaining dynamics in any given city. Though one might hope these effects would be captured 
by the city fixed effects analysis, power is not a static fixed value and can easily shift. Cities are complex, 
and that includes personal relationships and the relative bargaining strength between workers and their 
employers within the city framework.  
 Another limitation of the study is the limited availability of starting wage data. The California 
State Controller’s office only started collecting city compensation data in 2009, giving a much less robust 
set of data to work with. All data for starting wages comes from the Great Recession era or later, and thus 
misses a big part of the picture – I can only measure wages compared to debt after the larger increase in 
mean debt service burden which came in the lead-up to and during the economic downturn. Then again, it 
seems safe to say that there has been anything but wage recovery for city workers, at least in these three 
jobs.  
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 It is also just hard to compare wages between cities. Although I did use a strict methodology in 
selecting which wage to use for my measurement for each city, I cannot really guarantee that an 
Administrative Assistant in City A does the same thing as an Administrative Aide in City B – even if the 
two cities are adjacent. Without an analysis of the job duties of each position in question, there is no way 
to know if we are comparing apples to apples, or apples to some other kind of highly similar but 
qualitatively different fruit.   
 
Conclusion 
 The negative correlation between salary and some starting wages, on the one-hand, and debt service 
on the other hand makes sense and may hint at some degree of causality. While the complex forces which 
go into municipal budgeting are myriad, making definitive statements difficult, the regression models of 
Chapter 4 show a clear, statistically significant, and negative relationship between debt burden (as measured 
four ways) and salary expenditures. The inflexibility of debt service and the relative flexibility of salary 
expenditures likely further explains this relationship. The negative relationship is also in evidence for low-
wage job classification starting wages. The lack of a clear relationship here is likely at least partially due to 
the inflexible nature of each classification, with debt service payments being very rigid and employee 
starting wages effectively frozen for the duration of a city’s collective bargaining agreement.  
 All of these relationships are complicated, depend a lot on local tradition, history, and current city 
managerial staff. My models do not begin to explain all factors which go into a city’s relative prioritization 
of debt and salaries. But they do clarify that spending in one category may have a spillover into the other 
which is largely ignored by union negotiators in Southern California, and which may ultimately lead to 
lower wages as debt continues to increase.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Higher municipal debt service burdens correspond to lower wage expenditures for cities. My 
findings show that a city with a heavier debt burden will spend less money on its workforce, though it is 
not a dollar-for-dollar trade off. For small amounts of debt, the change is negligible. In large amounts, 
however, debt service could cause major disruptions to a city’s workforce. Furthermore, the trade-off may 
create long-term issues for future employees. This finding may explain to some degree the stagnancy in 
wages for public sector workers, particularly for low-wage employees.  
 Given this, unions should pay attention when a city takes on additional debt service burdens. Debt 
service can increase in several ways. The most obvious way is simply borrowing more money, which adds to 
the (usually amortized) annual payments cities must make. A burden can also increase if revenues decrease, 
since debt service obligations do not fluctuate and cities almost never attempt to renegotiate the terms of 
their obligations with their debtholders. When revenues decrease and debt service obligations stay the same, 
the city is going to have to make cuts elsewhere. Given its large proportion of a city budget, it makes sense 
workers would feel the belt tighten.  
 Unions would do well to pay closer attention to city borrowing. While its true that some projects 
may increase the general prosperity of a city, the end use of the debt is really important. Unions and 
residents each have a vested interest in seeing borrowed money well spent – this study indicates that both 
may end up paying a little for it. Increased scrutiny and transparency are key, and unions are in a unique 
place to negotiate such transparency into their collective bargaining agreements, since courts have blocked 
resident oversight over authority issued debts.  
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 Unions may also want to explore ways in which smaller cities can collectively seek better deals 
when the borrow, and help small cities avoid large debts, even if those debts seem manageable at the time 
the city borrows the money. The labor movement typically views city debts as benign or as a boon – they 
create public works or other projects that must be built and eventually staffed. In Southern California this 
more likely than not means new union members. This study indicates that pure benefit may not always be 
the outcome, however – even in well intentioned situations.  
 As the state rethinks the role of community redevelopment agencies, the primary vehicle for issuing 
debt in California until 2011 and the CRA v. Matosantos decision, unions should carefully measure their 
approach towards redevelopment. When used with restraint, the CRA system itself was a flexible tool for 
moving publicly-financed projects quickly and effectively. Restraint, however, was not a hallmark of the 
system, which rapidly became a property tax money grab. Unions may want to consider intervening on a 
policy level as the state recrafts a community redevelopment system in the coming years to either increase 
community accountability of redevelopment authorities, or place limits on their ability to borrow. 
 Other measures might include helping cities to stabilize their revenue streams. This is always a 
challenge in California, given the distortions and challenges posed by Proposition 13 and the other legacies 
of the Jarvis revolution. Though a tough sell for many, overturning Proposition 13 would go a long way to 
stabilizing city revenues and weaning municipalities off of higher-level government transfers. In 2020, 
Californians will have a chance to enact split roll property tax, which will essentially float commercial 
property taxes closer to the market rate for the first time since Proposition 13 passed, so the question is on 
peoples’ minds. Unions might also explore ways to raise tax revenue at the local level. 
 Unions may want to take the long-term view with debt service. In times of relative economic 
prosperity, and in a moderately healthy city, a little debt is not the end of the world and might be necessary 
for the city to function. Some debt-funded projects increase the prosperity of the community, which 
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ultimately benefits city workers. Some directly create new job opportunities for public sector employees. 
Paying for projects like these may seem to be an always great idea. 
 But economic prosperity is one thing guaranteed not to last – it will cycle in and out as time goes 
on. What may seem sustainable today may not be during a recession. In a small city, even a small debt 
burden can become overwhelming during a time of extreme economic downturn. If some predictions are 
correct, the pattern of extreme booms and busts seen during and immediately before this study’s sample 
period will continue into the future. When the bust comes, the other side of the trade-off may be lower 
salary expenditures or frozen starting wages. This study shows the debt burden has a relationship with 
these very important considerations. 
 The easiest way to lower debt burdens is by borrowing on better terms. Every city currently 
engages in borrowing on its own, with no oversight or help from the state. Under the old CRA system, 
which borrowed a lot of the debt measured in this study, communities had essentially no legal forum to 
even challenge, much less approve, CRA borrowing. A relatively small number of fixers connect cities with 
lines of credit. Firms that help cities borrow are not doing so out of civic-minded loyalty – they do it to 
make money. For large cities that routinely borrow and have expert in-house analysts, like Los Angeles, 
spotting a bum deal should be easy. But most cities in Southern California are not like Los Angeles. Unions 
should invest in financial research capacity to provide a helpful role in analyzing debt before its issued, 
giving independent analysis from the workforce’s perspective on the quality of the deal and the long-term 
effects on a city’s balance sheet. Taking a more active role in a city’s finances can decrease the ability of 
runaway city managers and shameless financial advisors from extracting wealth from cities through bad 
deals.  
 Unions can also help provide a connecting role between cities around borrowing. It goes without 
saying that all else being equal, the larger or more regular the borrower, the better the terms. A regional 
borrowing mechanism would be in much better bargaining position vis-à-vis financial institutions than a 
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small town which takes out a bond once every 6 years. Although city governments do connect with each 
other through organizations like the Southern California Association of Governments, the organizations do 
not foster collective behavior between governments when it comes to the process of borrowing itself. 
Though cities have wildly different credit histories and ratings, by working together all might be able to 
perform better. Because unions generally cross city lines, they are in a unique position to help cities 
coordinate on regional issues. Though it might require some bargaining capital to make it happen, by 
helping assemble regional working groups unions might be better positioned in the long run due to 
healthier balance sheets. 
 Union representatives with decades of negotiating with cities by and large know what they are 
doing. This study does not imply unions should drop everything and worry about debt – even my models 
show it is just a small part of what goes into determining wages. But a longer-term view on borrowing and 
the relationship between cities and lenders does seem to be in order for city workers and their 
representatives. As city finances become increasingly restricted, workers themselves can play a key role in 
repositioning our communities and ensuring borrowing is measured, fair, and responsible for future 
residents. This does not have to come from high-minded civic obligation, though civil servants often do 
care deeply about the communities they serve. Re-examining city debt can come out of self-interest for 
current and future workers while improving the overall fiscal health of cities. 
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Appendix A 
Cities of Southern California examined in this study: 
 
Adelanto 
Agoura Hills 
Alhambra 
Aliso Viejo 
Anaheim 
Apple Valley 
Arcadia 
Artesia 
Avalon 
Azusa 
Baldwin Park 
Banning 
Barstow 
Beaumont 
Bell 
Bell Gardens 
Bellflower 
Beverly Hills 
Big Bear Lake 
Blythe 
Bradbury 
Brawley 
Brea 
Buellton 
Buena Park 
Burbank 
Calabasas 
Calexico 
Calimesa 
Calipatria 
Camarillo 
Canyon Lake 
Carlsbad 
Carpinteria 
Carson 
Cathedral City 
Cerritos 
Chino 
Chino Hills 
Chula Vista 
Claremont 
Coachella 
Colton 
Commerce 
Compton 
Corona 
Coronado 
Costa Mesa 
Covina 
Cudahy 
Culver City 
Cypress 
Dana Point 
Del Mar 
Desert Hot Springs 
Diamond Bar 
Downey 
Duarte 
Eastvale 
El Cajon 
El Centro 
El Monte 
El Segundo 
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Encinitas 
Escondido 
Fillmore 
Fontana 
Fountain Valley 
Fullerton 
Garden Grove 
Gardena 
Glendale 
Glendora 
Goleta 
Grand Terrace 
Guadalupe 
Hawaiian Gardens 
Hawthorne 
Hemet 
Hermosa Beach 
Hesperia 
Hidden Hills 
Highland 
Holtville 
Huntington Beach 
Huntington Park 
Imperial 
Imperial Beach 
Indian Wells 
Indio 
Industry 
Inglewood 
Irvine 
Irwindale 
Jurupa Valley 
La Canada Flintridge 
La Habra 
La Habra Heights 
La Mesa 
La Mirada 
La Palma 
La Puente 
La Quinta 
La Verne 
Laguna Beach 
Laguna Hills 
Laguna Niguel 
Laguna Woods 
Lake Elsinore 
Lake Forest 
Lakewood 
Lancaster 
Lawndale 
Lemon Grove 
Loma Linda 
Lomita 
Lompoc 
Long Beach 
Los Alamitos 
Los Angeles 
Lynwood 
Malibu 
Manhattan Beach 
Maywood 
Menifee 
Mission Viejo 
Monrovia 
Montclair 
Montebello 
Monterey Park 
Moorpark 
Moreno Valley 
Murrieta 
National City 
Needles 
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Newport Beach 
Norco 
Norwalk 
Oceanside 
Ojai 
Ontario 
Orange 
Oxnard 
Palm Desert 
Palm Springs 
Palmdale 
Palos Verdes Estates 
Paramount 
Pasadena 
Perris 
Pico Rivera 
Placentia 
Pomona 
Port Hueneme 
Poway 
Rancho Cucamonga 
Rancho Mirage 
Rancho Palos Verdes 
Rancho Santa Margarita 
Redlands 
Redondo Beach 
Rialto 
Riverside 
Rolling Hills 
Rolling Hills Estates 
Rosemead 
San Bernardino 
San Buenaventura 
San Clemente 
San Diego 
San Dimas 
San Fernando 
San Gabriel 
San Jacinto 
San Juan Capistrano 
San Marcos 
San Marino 
Santa Ana 
Santa Barbara 
Santa Clarita 
Santa Fe Springs 
Santa Maria 
Santa Monica 
Santa Paula 
Santee 
Seal Beach 
Sierra Madre 
Signal Hill 
Simi Valley 
Solana Beach 
Solvang 
South El Monte 
South Gate 
South Pasadena 
Stanton 
Temecula 
Temple City 
Thousand Oaks 
Torrance 
Tustin 
Twentynine Palms 
Upland 
Vernon 
Victorville 
Villa Park 
Vista 
Walnut 
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West Covina 
West Hollywood 
Westlake Village 
Westminster 
Westmorland 
Whittier 
Wildomar 
Yorba Linda 
Yucaipa 
Yucca Valley
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Appendix B 
Cities dropped by selection for over 3000 residents: 
 Bradbury, 2003-2016 
 City of Industry, 2003-2016 
 Hidden Hills, 2003-2016 
 Irwindale, 2004-2016 
 Rolling Hills, 2005-2016 
 Vernon, 2003-2016 
 Westmorland, 2003-2016 
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